Commonwealth and Constitution by Claiborne, Robert S., Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 48
Issue 1 Annual Survey 2013 Article 14
11-1-2013
Commonwealth and Constitution
Robert S. Claiborne Jr.
University of Richmond School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert S. Claiborne Jr., Commonwealth and Constitution, 48 U. Rich. L. Rev. 415 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol48/iss1/14
COMMENT
COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION
"The peaceable character of an agricultural people did
not incline them to adopt the martial institutions of the
Roman or Spartan republics: nor did the extent of their
country, or the small number of its inhabitants in propor-
tion to that extent, invite or permit them to embrace those
of the Athenian or other populous republics of Greece. An
habitual predilection for what has been usually stiled the
democratic part of the British constitution, prompted an
experiment, to graft a scion from that branch of the gov-
ernment of their parent state, upon a pure republican
stock: and to ensure it's [sic] vigour and success, they
carefully lopt off from it every germ of monarchy, and
feudal aristocracy."
- St. George Tucker'
INTRODUCTION
Twelve years after Virginians peaceably instituted their first
constitution, they convened for what became an intense debate
over the Federal Constitution's ratification. Reaching temporary
compromise, in 1788 the Virginia Convention ratified the Federal
Constitution, which took force in 1789.2 Despite long deliberations
in the Philadelphia Convention and the ratification debates in the
several states' conventions, disagreement and debate continued
1. St. George Tucker, Of the Constitution of Virginia, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES app. c at 79 (St. George Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1803) (remarking on the Virgin-
ia Constitution's unique design).
2. See J. Gordon Hylton, Virginia and the Ratification of the Bill of Rights, 1789-
1791, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 433, 438-39, 441 (1991).
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over the Federal Constitution's meaning.' Nowhere was this disa-
greement more apparent than in Virginia. Home to the foremost
of our Founding Fathers, including the first president and the Fa-
ther of the Constitution, Virginia nonetheless found herself at
odds with the federal government's and federal courts' interpreta-
tion. Early controversies arose when Virginia alleged that Con-
gress exceeded its powers by enacting the 1791 Act of Assumption
and the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The General Assembly
assailed their unconstitutionality. The federal executive largely
ignored Virginia's 1791 protest," and although they became a po-
litical issue,' the Alien and Sedition Acts were enforced by the
federal courts-either avoiding arguments that the Acts infringed
upon the First Amendment' or finding the Acts constitutionally
valid.' Since the Federal Constitution's earliest days, similar con-
stitutional disagreements have arisen between the Common-
wealth and the federal government and judiciary.9 This disa-
greement has not been confined to Virginia's political branches; it
has also extended to the judiciary, most famously in the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals' conflict with the Supreme Court of the
United States over state sovereignty and appellate jurisdiction in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 0 In view of this early and continuing
disagreement over the Federal Constitution's meaning, it is pecu-
liar that, today, contemporary Virginia courts interpret certain
provisions in Virginia's constitution according to the federal
courts' interpretation of the Federal Constitution.
3. See id. at 433-34.
4. See H.J. Res. of Dec. 21, Va. Gen. Assembly (1798); H.J. Res. of Dec. 16, Va. Gen.
Assembly (1790).
5. See CHARLES PINNEGAR, VIRGINIA AND STATE RIGHTS, 1750-1861, at 108-09
(2009).
6. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1, at
924 (3d ed. 2006).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No.
14,865) (Chase, J.); United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No.
14,709).
8. See, e.g., Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 836-40 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126) (Iredell, J.)
(upholding the Alien and Sedition Acts' validity under Article I and the First Amendment).
9. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 2011); S.J. Res. 3, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 1956); H.J. Res. of Mar. 6, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1827); H.J.
Res. of Mar. 4, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1826); H.J. Res. 2, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 1821); H.J. Res. of Jan. 22, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1811); H.J. Res. of Dec. 21,
Va. Gen. Assembly (1798); H.J. Res. of Dec. 16, Va. Gen. Assembly (1790).
10. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), rev'g Hunter v. Martin,
18 Va. (4 Munf.) 11 (1815); cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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Virginia's sovereignty itself seems to undermine coextensive in-
terpretation." Virginia has greatly influenced our federal gov-
ernment and Federal Bill of Rights; however, her history and law
are distinct from those of the several states and, necessarily, the
United States. A distinct people settled Virginia, brought with
them law and settled traditions, broke from the Crown, and es-
tablished their own constitution and laws before joining the sev-
eral states under the Articles of Confederation and, then, the
Federal Constitution. Virginians are citizens of these two sover-
eigns, the Commonwealth and the United States, and each sover-
eign's constitution sets forth its fundamental law. Yet Virginia
courts interpret several provisions of the Virginia Constitution as
coextensive with the Federal Constitution. In these instances, the
courts do not rely on federal precedent as persuasive authority
but as binding precedent for construing protections under the
Virginia Constitution.
Coextension's criticism is not new in Virginia," but this com-
ment supplements the prior discussion from a practical approach.
It offers new criticisms and provides some concrete analysis that
may assist a return to the Virginia Constitution's independent in-
terpretation. In Part I, this comment exposes coextension's tenu-
ous origins. It examines foundational errors in its precedent and
questions the curious role coextension has come to serve as an ex-
11. The Hon. Stephen R. McCullough, A Vanishing Virginia Constitution?, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 347, 351-52 (2011).
12. See id. 350-54; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.
574, 588, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922-23 (1981) (quoting VA. COMM'N ON CONST. REV., THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 86 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("That most of
the provisions of the Virginia Bill of Rights have their parallel in the Federal Bill of Rights
is ... no good reason not to look first to Virginia's Constitution for the safeguards of the
fundamental rights of Virginians. The Commission believes that the Virginia Bill of Rights
should be a living and operating instrument of government and should, by stating the
basic safeguards of the people's liberties, minimize the occasion for Virginians to resort to
the Federal Constitution and the federal courts.") (second alteration in original); A.E. Dick
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873, 935-36 (1976); cf. Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 803 (1872) (Bouldin, J.,
dissenting) ("[T'he question before us is not how a high prerogative is exercised by the
King of Great Britain, but to what extent the power has been vested in the Governor of
Virginia under her constitution and laws. On that question I am constrained to differ with
my brethen. I do not concur in the opinion just expressed, that the pardoning power of the
Governor of Virginia is, in general, coextensive with that of the crown of Great Britain.");
Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping? 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1501 (2005) (foot-
note omitted) ('This is a discussion that continues to become more sophisticated, both in
the courts and in the academic literature."). Another author has expressed astonishment
that Virginia courts interpret constitutional provisions coextensively. See JOHN DINAN,
THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 44-45 (2006).
2013] 417
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ception to established rules of constitutional interpretation in
Virginia. Part II discusses the differing rules of constitutional in-
terpretation in Virginia and federal courts as well as the substan-
tive, textual differences between the two constitutions. It further
interprets and distinguishes the coextensive provisions' textual
meaning and compares the Virginia Constitution's plain textual
meaning with the federal courts' construction of similar federal
protections. Part III addresses the practical implications for con-
stitutional litigation in Virginia," examining independent inter-
pretation's potential effects. It addresses the Virginia Constitu-
tion's interaction with the Supremacy Clause and federal
protections that have been selectively incorporated against the
Commonwealth, independent interpretation's present and pro-
spective effects on Virginia litigation, independent interpreta-
tion's interaction with the federal courts' comity jurisprudence
and jurisdiction to review state courts' decisions, and federalism
implications that stem from the application of those doctrines.
This comment concludes that coextension's faults warrant its
abandonment.
I. COEXTENSION'S FOUNDATIONAL ERRORS
Virginia courts apply coextensive interpretation to constitu-
tional provisions addressing inherent rights; speedy trial; self-
incrimination; double jeopardy; searches and seizures; due pro-
cess; antidiscrimination; speech, press, assembly, and petition;
arms and militias; and religious freedom and establishment." De-
spite coextension's reach, the approach is a recent development in
Virginia law. Its origin is tenuous at best.
A. Virginia's Constitution and Federal Standards
For much of the Commonwealth's history, her constitution has
been paramount in governing Virginia's internal affairs. In June
1776, Virginia instituted the Declaration of Rights and Plan of
Government.15 At that point, Virginia was a free and independent
13. DINAN, supra note 12, at 45.
14. See infra note 47.
15. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES HELD AT THE CAPITOL, IN
THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG, IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA, ON MONDAY THE 6TH OF MAY,
1776, at 167 (1776) (resolving unanimously in favor of the plan of government on June 29,
1776); id. at 100-03 (passing the Declaration of Rights on June 12, 1776); id. at 32 (resolv-
418 [Vol. 48:415
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state, and her fundamental law-her constitution-was the su-
preme law of the Commonwealth.16 When they took force in 1781,
the Articles of Confederation imposed few limitations on state ac-
tion. The states granted Congress only powers involving foreign
and interstate affairs. 7 They retained nearly complete autonomy
over their internal affairs." The people of the respective states
granted a federal government greater power under the Federal
Constitution, but even it limited the states in only a few, specified
areas." Additionally, the limited body of federal law lessened the
occasion for preemption during the Republic's earlier years.20 Vir-
ginia enjoyed similar sovereignty under the Confederate Consti-
tution," but it eroded as restrictive war measures were imposed.22
The most onerous federal standards were imposed under military
rule during Reconstruction.22 When Virginia's respect as a sover-
eign state was restored, the Reconstruction Amendments imposed
greater limitations on Virginians' ability to design their constitu-
tion than the Federal Constitution had before secession.24 None-
ing unanimously on May 15, 1776, to instruct their representatives in the Continental
Congress to declare the colonies free and independent states). This was Virginia's first
written constitution following independence. Before independence, colonial Virginians
found support for their individual rights and rights of self-government in their hereditary
rights as Englishmen and their founding charters. See A.E. Dick Howard, The Bridge at
Jamestown: The Virginia Charter of 1606 and Constitutionalism in the Modern World, 42
U. RICH. L. REV. 9, 23, 28 (2007). See generally, Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the
Rights of British America (1774), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 63
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904); RICHARD BLAND, AN INQUIRY INTO THE RIGHTS OF THE
BRITISH COLONIES (1766). After Virginia's independence, new Virginia constitutions were
effected in 1830, 1851, 1870, 1902, and 1971. A.E. Dick Howard, Foreword to VA. CONST.,
available at http://constitution.legis.virginia.gov/Constitution-01-13.pdf
16. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 222-23 (1796).
17. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, IX.
18. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446-48
(1987); see Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Con-
federation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249, 285-302 (1997).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) ("The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State Governments, are numerous and indefinite.").
20. But see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 253-54 (2000).
21. Compare C.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1861), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
22. See generally David P. Currie, Through the Looking-Glass: The Confederate Con-
stitution in Congress, 1861-1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257 (2004) (describing the Confederate
States' wartime measures and the resulting constitutional crises).
23. 1 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 14-15
(1974).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV. Following the Reconstruction Amend-
ments' passage, several additional federal constitutional limitations were passed. See id.
amend. XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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theless, the Virginia Constitution's unique primacy over Virginia
affairs largely continued.
By the 1960s, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States' increased incorporation of federal protections against the
states and construal of those provisions to target a greater scope
of state action reached its peak.25 The Federal Bill of Rights gov-
erned many individual rights that were once vindicated under on-
ly state constitutions.2 6 The federal courts exerted increased con-
trol over state action during that period, but they began to step
back during the 1970s.27 Today, they similarly accord states digni-
ty and respect as separate sovereigns.28 Virginia courts, however,
have continued the federalization of Virginia's constitutional
standards through coextensive interpretation, interpreting pro-
tections in the Virginia Constitution according only to the federal
courts' interpretation of the Federal Constitution.
B. Coextension's Origin
Coextension developed recently. For much of the Common-
wealth's history, Virginia courts interpreted the Virginia Consti-
tution according to its own meaning. From 1776 to 1985, no Vir-
ginia court declared the constitutions to be coextensive. Virginia
courts acknowledged some provisions of the Virginia and federal
constitutions to be similar, sometimes cited persuasive federal
precedent, and not uncommonly found that the two constitutions
dictated the same result-but the courts applied the constitutions
independently, with each retaining its own meaning." In 1985,
25. See Developments in the Law--The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1328 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1328-29.
28. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. , , 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013);
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., _, U.S., -, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257-60
(2013); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S., _, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78,
2602-07 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. _, _, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2364-65 (2011); Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203-06
(2009); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-21 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557 (1995) (citation omitted); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-63 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Working Waterman's Ass'n v. Seafood Harvesters, Inc., 227 Va. 101, 109,
314 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1984) (observing only that the federal and Virginia contract clauses
are treated similarly); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 638, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1973) (in-
terpreting Virginia Constitution article I, section 11 independently and stating merely
that it is "no broader than" the federal Equal Protection Clause); York v. City of Danville,
420 [Vol. 48:415
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however, the Supreme Court of Virginia construed the first of ten
Virginia constitutional protections to be coextensive with similar
federal protections." This was only fourteen years after Virginia
207 Va. 665, 671, 152 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1967) (finding a parade ordinance violated the fed-
eral and Virginia constitutions under the same analysis but not stating they were coexten-
sive); Zimmerman v. Town of Bedford, 134 Va. 787, 801-02, 115 S.E. 362, 366 (1922) (stat-
ing merely that Virginia statutes imposed a "practically identical" requirement as the
Fourth Amendment); Flanary v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 775, 779-80, 75 S.E. 289, 291
(1912) (stating that Virginia's constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination
was "in effect identical" with the Fifth Amendment as construed in Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906), but not reaching that determination by declaring the protections coexten-
sive); Martin v. Snowden, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 100, 109 (1868) (stating, in dicta, that Con-
gress' and the states' general powers of direct taxation are "co-extensive and alike unlim-
ited" but not discussing possible limitations imposed by a state constitution). The dissent
in Lee v. Murphy asserted that the court construed the governor's pardoning power to be
coextensive with that of the King of Great Britain, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 803 (1872)
(Bouldin, J., dissenting), but the majority actually interpreted the Virginia Constitution's
text with assistance from its common law background. Id. at 791-92 (opinion of the court).
That is not coextensive interpretation. It is a proper means of constitutional interpreta-
tion, based on the Virginia Constitution's text and history. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782,
787, 91 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1956).
30. Concededly, it is difficult to determine the first case in which a Virginia court con-
strued a provision in the Commonwealth's constitution to be coextensive with the Federal
Constitution. Virginia courts have not uncommonly and not inappropriately relied on per-
suasive federal precedent without coextensively construing constitutional protections. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text. The first case expressly declaring constitutional
provisions to be "coextensive" was Turner v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 737, 743, 420
S.E.2d 235, 238-39 (1992), and the trend is certainly recent, see DINAN, supra note 12, at
45, 63, but Turner and other recent Virginia cases have cited older precedents for the
proposition that Virginia courts coextensively interpret constitutional provisions. E.g.,
Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 729, 739-40, 467 S.E.2d 306, 311 (1996) (citing
Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 682, 133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963); Flanary v. Com-
monwealth, 113 Va. 775, 779, 75 S.E. 289, 291 (1912)) (other citations omitted); Turner, 14
Va. App. at 743, 420 S.E.2d at 239 (citing Kirby v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 806, 808, 167
S.E.2d 411, 412 (1969); Chevrolet Truck v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 508, 158 S.E.2d
755, 757 (1968)). The cases cited, however, held that Virginia statutes imposed the same
requirement as a federal constitutional protection, Kirby, 209 Va. at 808, 167 S.E.2d at
412; Chevrolet Truck, 208 Va. at 508, 158 S.E.2d at 757, or that a Virginia constitutional
protection, independently interpreted, required the same result as the Federal Constitu-
tion in the case before the court. Walton, 204 Va. at 682, 133 S.E.2d at 318. Those ap-
proaches were different from coextension, but Flanary's approach was closer. The court
stated that the Fifth Amendment "is, in effect, identical with" Virginia Constitution article
I, section 8's self-incrimination provision; however, this was only dictum. See 113 Va. at
779, 75 S.E. at 291. Moreover, the court's reliance on the Fifth Amendment and federal
precedent was narrowly limited. The court's language seemed to suggest that the constitu-
tions' effects were identical only to the limited extent that it quoted from Hale v. Henkel.
See id. The court further limited its discussion to the constitutional protections' respective
relationships with the respective sovereigns' immunity statutes. See id. at 779-80, 75 S.E.
at 291. It did not hold out federal law as imposing the same requirement but merely con-
sidered the relationship between the Federal Constitution and federal immunity statute to
be persuasive in considering the relationship between the Virginia Constitution and im-
munity statute. See id. The court simply relied on persuasive federal precedent to assist
its larger discussion, which rested on Virginia precedents that applied the Virginia Consti-
tution without mentioning federal protections. Compare id. at 777-80, 75 S.E.2d at 290-
91 (citing Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 490 (1884); Temple v. Commonwealth, 75
2013] 421
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ratified her constitution of 1971, which the commission on consti-
tutional revision reported "should be a living and operating in-
strument of government and should, by stating the basic safe-
guards of the people's liberties, minimize the occasion for
Virginians to resort to the Federal Constitution and the federal
courts.""
Lowe v. Commonwealth involved a drunk driving conviction
and a defense challenging a checkpoint search's constitutionali-
ty.3 The specific issue before the court was the checkpoint's rea-
sonableness under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution and article I, section 10 of the Virginia Constitution." Each
provision addresses searches and seizures, but article I, section
10 discusses only warrant requirements." The Supreme Court of
Virginia applied both constitutions under the same Fourth
Amendment analysis." It cited Professor Howard's then eleven-
year-old Commentaries on the Virginia Constitution for the prop-
Va. 892 (1881); Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 624 (1873)), with Kendrick, 78
Va. at 492-93; Temple, 75 Va. at 895-96; Cullen, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) at 627. What the court
in Bennefield considered coextensive interpretation was merely the court's reliance in
Flanary on persuasive federal precedent, which only complemented the Virginia precedent
applied in the case. Even assuming that the court in Flanary might have announced coex-
tensive interpretation, coextension would not accurately describe the analysis the court
undertook, and in any event, the court's comparative statement was merely dictum.
Turner first used the word "coextensive" to affirmatively describe constitutional provi-
sions, but Lowe v. Commonwealth was coextension's actual origin. The Supreme Court of
Virginia quoted the Fourth Amendment and Virginia Constitution article I, section 10
alongside each other, described them as substantially similar, and affirmatively stated
that the constitutional provisions would require the same analysis. Lowe v. Common-
wealth, 230 Va. 346, 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d 273, 274 n.1 (1985). Although the court stated
that the Virginia Constitution and Virginia statutes effected the same rule as the Fourth
Amendment, id., the issue before the court was only whether the Virginia and federal con-
stitutions permitted the search. Id. at 348, 337 S.E.2d at 274. The appellant argued only
from the Virginia and federal constitutions, and the court's actual analysis did not impli-
cate the statutes' meaning. See id. The strong inference from the court's wording was that
the constitutional provisions would require the same analysis in every case, rendering
them coextensive. This approach was different from any the court previously took when
interpreting the Virginia Constitution.
31. VA. COMM'N ON CONST. REV., supra note 12, at 86 ("That most of the provisions of
the Virginia Bill of Rights have their parallel in the Federal Bill of Rights is . . . no good
reason not to look first to Virginia's Constitution for the safeguards of the fundamental
rights of Virginians. The Commission believes that the Virginia Bill of Rights should be a
living and operating instrument of government and should, by stating the basic safe-
guards of the people's liberties, minimize the occasion for Virginians to resort to the Fed-
eral Constitution and the federal courts."), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, 222 Va. 574, 588, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922-23 (1981).
32. 230 Va. at 347, 337 S.E.2d at 274.
33. Id. at 348, 337 S.E.2d at 274.
34. Compare VA. CONST. art. I, § 10, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Lowe, 230 Va. at 348 & n., 337 S.E.2d at 274 & n.1.
422 [Vol. 48:415
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osition that Virginia's constitutional and statutory requirements
were "substantially the same as those contained in the Fourth
Amendment,"" but the court neither mentioned nor applied those
statutes." This is troubling in several respects. First, the applica-
ble statutes' text does not plainly impose the same Fourth
Amendment requirements, but Virginia courts have construed
them to do so." The court circularly used these statutes-which
are similar to the Fourth Amendment only because the courts
have construed them that way-to similarly construe article I,
section 10 to be coextensive with the Fourth Amendment. Second,
Article I, section 10 includes no reasonableness requirement, and
its text did not apply to the facts in Lowe. Article I, section 10 on-
ly defines requirements for a valid warrant before conducting a
search or seizure." The court conferred Fourth Amendment
meaning to a substantively different constitutional provision.40
Third, the court's construal of Professor Howard's work was prob-
lematic. Although Professor Howard acknowledged Zimmerman
v. Town of Bedford's holding that Virginia statutes imposed the
same standard as the Fourth Amendment,4 1 he understood that
the Virginia Constitution requires independent analysis:
Since search and seizure statutes have been in force in Virginia ever
since that decision, the [Supreme Court of Virginia] has never had
occasion to face directly the question of whether probable cause is
implicit in the "evidence" language of section 10 and whether there-
fore the same probable cause standard would apply even if there
42
were no statutes.
36. Id. at 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d at 274 n.1 (quoting 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 182).
37. Id. at 348 & n.1, 337 S.E.2d at 274 & n.1.
38. E.g., Thims v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 85, 93, 235 S.E.2d 443, 448 (1977) (inter-
preting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59 (Repl. Vol. 1975), which, by its plain language, prohibits
searches without warrants unless the officer is enforcing, and empowered to enforce, game
or marine fisheries laws).
39. See infra Part II.B.5.
40. See infra Part II.B.5.
41. 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 179 (quoting Zimmerman v. Town of Bedford 134 Va.
787, 802, 115 S.E. 362, 366 (1922)).
42. Id. Without explanation or citation, he answered that the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia "[q]uite likely ... would say that it would." Id. The court might say so, but closer in-
spection demonstrates it would be mistaken. See infra Part II.B.5. Professor Howard also
considered the question "moot," given the Fourth Amendment's incorporation against the
Commonwealth. Id. But incorporation alone does not displace the Virginia Constitution.
See infra Part III.A. That might be so if article I, section 10 imposed a warrant require-
ment lesser than probable cause. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995). However, ar-
ticle I, section 10's plain text suggests differently. See infra Part II.B.5.
2013]1 423
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The Lowe court took a quotation out of context and gave it a
different meaning from the author's. The discrepancy is im-
portant. The court properly applied the Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis, but article I, section 10 did not apply to the underlying facts.
The court's construal replaced article I, section 10's intrinsic, tex-
tual meaning with the federal courts' interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.4 3 Subsequent opinions have relied on Lowe, reiterat-
ing that the protections are coextensive." None discussed the
misquotation, much less the constitutions' different text and
meaning.
Coextension's reach has expanded,45 leading to the court of ap-
peals' broad declaration: "We have consistently held that the pro-
tections afforded under the Virginia Constitution are co-extensive
with those in the United States Constitution. Our analysis ...
therefore, proceeds down one, not two, constitutional tracks."46
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not made such a broad asser-
tion, but it recently stated that "substantively similar" Virginia
and federal constitutional provisions "will be afforded the same
meaning."47 Each approach is a curious departure from Virginia's
well-established rules of constitutional interpretation, but the
court of appeals' assertion is particularly troubling. Constitution-
al interpretation requires examination of the text, contemporary
meaning, and historical background"-not the federal judiciary's
construction of the Federal Constitution. Although some Virginia
laws receive and apply foreign standards, they accomplish it by
plain, statutory command." The Virginia Constitution has no re-
ceiving clause. Even since coextensive interpretation took root in
43. See Lowe, 230 Va. at 349-50, 337 S.E.2d at 275-76.
44. E.g., Foltz v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 107, 128 n. 15, 706 S.E.2d 914, 925 n.15
(2011) (citing Lowe, 230 Va. at 348, 337 S.E.2d at 274), affd 284 Va. 467, 732 S.E.2d 4
(2012); Simmons v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 445, 451 & n.2, 371 S.E.2d 7, 10 & n.2
(1988) (citing Lowe, 230 Va. at 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d at 274 n.1), rev'd on other grounds by
238 Va. 200, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989).
45. Cf. infra note 50.
46. Roadcap v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 732, 743-44, 653 S.E.2d 620, 626 (2007)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
47. DiGiacinto v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 281 Va. 127, 134, 704
S.E.2d 365, 369 (2011).
48. See infra Part II.A.1.
49. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013) ("The common
law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and
Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be
the rule of decision, except as altered by the General Assembly."); W. HAMILTON BRYSON,
VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.02[1][a], at 2-4 to 2-11 (2005 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
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1985, its application has been inconsistent. As they are presently
understood, the coextensive provisions are found only in the Vir-
ginia Constitution's bill of rights."o Still, a substantial majority of
Virginia's bill of rights protections are interpreted independent-
ly," including several substantively similar protections.5 2 The re-
50. E.g., Paris v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 377, 381, 545 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2001)
(interpreting article I, section 1 to be coextensive with federal substantive due process);
Farmer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 337, 340, 404 S.E.2d 371, 372 (1999) (interpreting
the article I, section 8 right against compelled self-incrimination to be coextensive with the
Fifth Amendment right); Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 729, 739-40, 467
S.E.2d 306, 311 (1996) (interpreting the article I, section 8 right against double jeopardy to
be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment right); Holliday v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App.
612, 615-16, 352 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1987) (interpreting the article I, section 8 right to a
speedy trial to be coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right); Simmons v. Common-
wealth, 6 Va. App. 445, 451 & n.2, 371 S.E.2d 7, 10 & n.2 (citing Lowe v. Commonwealth,
230 Va. 346, 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d 273, 274 n.1), rev'd on other grounds by 238 Va. 200, 380
S.E.2d 656 (1989) (interpreting article I, section 10 to be coextensive with the Fourth
Amendment); Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2005) (in-
terpreting the article 1, section 11 right to due process to be coextensive with federal pro-
cedural due process); Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 466-67, 571 S.E.2d 100, 111 (2002)
(interpreting the article I, section 11 protection against discrimination to be coextensive
with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Elliott v. Commonwealth,
267 Va. 464, 473-74, 593 S.E.2d 263, 269 (2004) (interpreting article 1, section 12 to be
coextensive with the First Amendment's speech protections); Digiacinto, 281 Va. at 133-
34, 704 S.E.2d at 368-69 (interpreting article I, section 13 to be coextensive with the Sec-
ond Amendment); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 260 Va. 608, 626, 538 S.E.2d 682, 691
(2000) (interpreting article I, section 16 to be coextensive with the First Amendment's Es-
tablishment Clause).
51. E.g., R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Comm. for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 239
Va. 484, 489, 391 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1990) (interpreting article I, section 2); Staples v.
Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 621, 33 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1945) (interpreting what is now article I, sec-
tion 3); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 101, 376 S.E.2d 525, 532 (1989) (inter-
preting article I, section 4); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 337-38, 468 S.E.2d 98,
106 (1996) (interpreting article I, section 5), overruled on other grounds by Morrisette v.
Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 613 S.E.2d 551 (2005); Marshall v. N.
Va. Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 434-35, 657 S.E.2d 71, 79 (2008) (interpreting article I,
section 6); Grier v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 560, 567-66, 546 S.E.2d 743, 746 (2001)
(interpreting article I, section 8's right to demand the cause and nature of accusation);
Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501, 508-09, 450 S.E.2d 146, 151 (1994), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1097 (1995) (interpreting article I, section 8's right of an accused to call for evi-
dence in his favor); Vescuso v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 59, 64-65, 360 S.E.2d 547, 549
(1987) (interpreting article I, section 8's right to a public trial); King v. Commonwealth, 40
Va. App. 364, 373-75, 579 S.E.2d 634, 639-40 (2003) (interpreting article I, section 8's
right to a jury trial); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 819, 823-26, 66 S.E.2d 841,
843-45 (1951) (interpreting article 1, section 8's right to a jury of the defendant's vicinage);
Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 516, 628 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006) (interpreting ar-
ticle I, section 8-A); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 205-06, 590 S.E.2d 500, 535-
36 (2004) (applying article I, section 9's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment); Heublein, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 237 Va. 192, 196, 376 S.E.2d
77, 78-79 (1989) (interpreting article I, section 11's contracts clause); Ottofaro v. City of
Hampton, 265 Va. 26, 31-32, 574 S.E.2d 235, 237-38 (2003) (interpreting article I, section
11's takings clause); Moore v. Moore, 61 Va. Cir. 668, 668-69 (2002) (City of Roanoke) (in-
terpreting article I, section 11's provisions addressing civil jury trials); Digiacinto, 281 Va.
at 137-39, 704 S.E.2d at 370-72 (interpreting article I, section 14); Prashad v. Copeland,
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maining provisions, addressing the government's structure and
powers, are also interpreted independently." The vast majority of
55 Va. App. 247, 263-64, 685 S.E.2d 199, 207 (2009) (interpreting article I, section 15-A);
see, e.g., Perry v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 655, 665, 673, 712 S.E.2d 765, 770, 774
(2011) (noting the appellant's Sixth Amendment and article I, section 8 confrontation
claims but not declaring them coextensive); Pilcher v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 158,
163-64, 583 S.E.2d 70, 72-73 (2003) (applying the Federal Constitution's and article I,
section 9's prohibitions against ex post facto laws with assistance from federal precedent
but not declaring them coextensive).
52. E.g., Jackson, 267 Va. at 205-06, 590 S.E.2d at 535-36; Ottofaro, 265 Va. at 31-
32, 574 S.E.2d at 237-38; Heublein, 237 Va. at 196, 376 S.E.2d at 78-79; King, 40 Va. App.
at 373-75, 579 S.E.2d at 639-40; Vescuso, 5 Va. App. at 64-65, 360 S.E.2d at 549-50;
Covel v. Town of Vienna, 78 Va. Cir. 190, 199-203 (2009) (Fairfax County), affd, 280 Va.
151, 694 S.E.2d 609 (2010) (interpreting article IV, section 9's speech and debate clause
under Virginia and federal precedent but not declaring the provisions coextensive); Moore,
61 Va. Cir. at 668-69; see, e.g., Perry, 58 Va. App. at 665, 673, 712 S.E.2d at 770, 774;
Pilcher, 41 Va. App. at 163-64, 583 S.E.2d at 72-73.
53. E.g., Sachs v. Horan, 252 Va. 247, 250, 475 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1996) (interpreting
article II, section 1); Moore v. Pullern, 150 Va. 174, 193, 142 S.E. 415, 321 (1928) (inter-
preting what is now amended as article II, section 2); Fairfax Cnty. Taxpayers Alliance v.
Board of Cnty. Supervisors, 202 Va. 462, 471, 117 S.E.2d 753, 759 (1961) (interpreting
what is now amended as article II, section 3); Pullem, 150 Va. at 197, 142 S.E. at 422 (in-
terpreting what is now amended as article II, section 4); Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219,
235-36, 72 S.E.2d 506, 516-17 (1952) (interpreting what is now amended as article II, sec-
tion 5); Wilkins, 264 Va. at 462-63, 571 S.E.2d at 108 (interpreting article II, section 6);
Dovel v. Bertram, 184 Va. 19, 22, 34 S.E.2d 369, 370-71 (1945) (interpreting what is now
article II, section 8); In re Horan, 271 Va. 258, 263, 634 S.E.2d 675, 679 (2006) (applying
article III, section 1); Marshall, 275 Va. at 434, 435, 657 S.E.2d at 79 (interpreting article
IV, section 1); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 371-72, 514 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1999) (inter-
preting article IV, section 5); Covel, 78 Va. Cir. at 199-203 (interpreting article IV, section
9); Marshall, 275 Va. at 434 & n.2, 657 S.E.2d at 79 & n.2 (interpreting article IV, section
11); id. at 428-31, 694 S.E.2d at 76-77 (interpreting article IV, section 12); Finn v. Va. Re-
tirement Sys., 259 Va. 144, 154, 524 S.E.2d 125, 131 (2000) (applying article IV, section
13); McConville v. Rhoads, 67 Va. Cir. 392, 394 (2005) (City of Norfolk) (interpreting arti-
cle IV, section 14); Terry v. Mazur, 234 Va. 442, 456-57, 362 S.E.2d 904, 912 (1987) (inter-
preting article IV, section 15); Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 524 (4th Cir. 1986) (apply-
ing article IV, section 16); Thomson v. Robb, 229 Va. 233, 242-43, 328 S.E.2d 136, 141-42
(1985) (applying article V, section 2); Brault v. Holleman, 217 Va. 441, 445, 230 S.E.2d
238, 241 (1976) (interpreting article V, section 6); Allen v. Byrd, 151 Va. 21, 24-25, 144
S.E. 469, 470 (1928) (per curiam) (interpreting what is now article V, section 7); Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 324-25 (1977) (applying article V, section
12); In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 38, 677 S.E.2d 236, 255 (2009) (interpreting article
VI, section 1); Allen, 151 Va. at 23, 144 S.E. at 469 (interpreting what is now article VI,
section 2); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 519, 273 S.E.2d 36, 40 (1980) (interpret-
ing article VI, section 5); Kearns v. Hall, 197 Va. 736, 744, 91 S.E.2d 648, 653-54 (1956)
(applying what is now article VI, section 6); Thompson v. Walker, 758 F.2d 1004, 1007 n.7
(4th Cir. 1985) (interpreting article VI, section 9); Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm'n of
Va. v. Elliott, 272 Va. 97, 118, 630 S.E.2d 485, 496 (2006) (applying article VI, section 10);
Infants v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 221 Va. 659, 675, 272 S.E.2d 649, 658-59 (1980) (applying
article VII, section 1); Alderson v. Cnty. of Alleghany, 266 Va. 333, 341-42, 585 S.E.2d
795, 799 (2003) (applying article VII, section 2); Gray v. Va. Sec'y of Transp., 74 Va. Cir.
30, 30 (2007) (City of Richmond) (applying article VII, section 3), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 276 Va. 93, 662 S.E.2d 66 (2008); Walker v. Massie, 202 Va. 886,
889, 121 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1961) (interpret what is now article VII, section 4); City Council
v. Newsome, 226 Va. 518, 524, 311 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1984) (applying article VII, section 7);
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the Virginia Constitution is interpreted according to its own
meaning. Coextension arose as a curious exception to the well-
established rules of constitutional interpretation, and the court of
appeals' declaration is troubling given coextension's inconsistent
and apparently arbitrary application. The approach the Supreme
Court of Virginia announced is similarly puzzling for its depar-
ture from the well-established rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion, and its approach is not applied consistently.
Bray v. Brown, 258 Va. 618, 621, 521 S.E.2d 526, 527-28 (1999) (applying article VII, sec-
tion 6); Town of Madison, Inc. v. Ford, 255 Va. 429, 432-33, 498 S.E.2d 235, 236 (1998)
(interpreting article VII, section 7); Potomac Edison Co. v. Town of Luray, 234 Va. 348,
352-53, 362 S.E.2d 678, 680-81 (1987) (interpreting article VII, section 8); Stendig Dev.
Corp. v. City of Danville, 214 Va. 548, 550-51, 202 S.E.2d 871, 873-74 (1974) (per curiam)
(interpreting what is now article VII, section 9); Dykes v. N. Va. Transp. Dist. Comm'n,
242 Va. 357, 372-75, 411 S.E.2d 1, 9-10 (1991) (applying article VII, section 10); Cnty.
Sch. Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 659, 133 S.E.2d 565, 573-74 (1963) (applying what is now
article VIII, section 1); Scott v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 379, 384-85, 443 S.E.2d 138, 141-
42 (1994) (interpreting article VIII, section 1); id. (interpreting article VIII, section 2); Sch.
Bd. v. Parham, 218 Va. 950, 955, 243 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1978) (applying article VIII, section
5); Bristol Va. Sch. Bd. v. Quarles, 235 Va. 108, 119, 336 S.E,2d 82, 88-89 (1988) (inter-
preting article VIII, section 7); Va. Pub. Sch. Auth. v. Craigie, 212 Va. 464, 469, 184 S.E.2d
803, 807 (1971) (applying article VIII, section 8); Miller v. Ayres, 214 Va. 171, 179, 198
S.E.2d 634, 630-40 (1973) (applying article VIII, section 10); id. at 178, 198 S.E.2d at 639-
40 (applying article VIII, section 11); Thomson, 229 Va. at 239, 328 S.E.2d at 139 (inter-
preting article IX, section 1); Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Div. of Consumer Coun-
sel, 220 Va. 773, 788, 263 S.E.2d 867, 875 (1980) (interpreting article IX, section 3); Atlas
Underwriters, Ltd. v. SCC, 237 Va. 45, 48-49, 375 S.E.2d 733, 735 (1989) (interpreting
article IX, section 4); Winchester & W.R.R. v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 352, 358, 309
S.E.2d 590, 594 (1983) (applying article IX, section 5); French v. Cumberland Bank &
Trust Co., 194 Va. 475, 482, 74 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1953) (interpreting what is now article IX,
section 6); Potomac Edison Co., 234 Va. at 348, 354, 362 S.E.2d at 681 (applying article IX,
section 7); Lee Gardens Arlington Ltd. P'ship v. Arlington Cnty. Bd., 250 Va. 534, 538-
539, 463 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1995) (interpreting article X, section 1); Smith v. Board of Su-
pervisors, 234 Va. 250, 257, 361 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1987) (interpreting article X, section 2);
McMahon v. City of Virginia Beach, 221 Va. 102, 108, 267 S.E.2d 130, 134 (1980) (applying
article X, section 3); Westminster-Canterbury of Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of Virginia
Beach, 238 Va. 493, 501, 385 S.E.2d 561, 565 (1989) (interpreting article X, section 6);
Button v. Day, 203 Va. 687, 694, 127 S.E.2d 122, 128 (1962) (interpreting what is now ar-
ticle X, section 7); Fairfax Cnty. Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 360, 150 S.E.2d
87, 94-95 (1966) (applying what is now article X, section 8); Miller v. Watts, 215 Va. 836,
840-42, 214 S.E.2d 165, 169 (1975) (interpreting article X, section 9); Almond v. Day, 197
Va. 782, 790-93, 91 S.E.2d 660, 666-68 (1956) (interpreting article X, section 10); Robb v.
Shockoe Slip Found., 228 Va. 678, 683, 324 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1985) (interpreting article XI,
section 1); id. at 682-83, 324 S.E.2d at 677 (interpreting article XI, section 2); Avery v.
Beale, 195 Va. 690, 698-99, 80 S.E.2d 584, 590 (1954) (applying what is now article XI,
section 3); Orion Sporting Grp., LLC v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 196-99 (2005)
(Amherst County) (interpreting article XI, section 4); Coleman v. Pross, 219 Va. 143, 152-
54, 246 S.E.2d 613, 619-20 (1978) (interpreting article XII, section 1); Staples, 183 Va. at
621-29, 33 S.E.2d at 51-55 (interpreting what is now article XII, section 2).
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C. Historical Rebuttal
History has tempted courts to coextensive interpretation,5 4 but
the Virginia Declaration of Rights' influence on and similarity to
the Federal Bill of Rights has been overstated." That is especially
so for attempts to define the 1776 Declaration of Rights by the
1791 Federal Bill of Rights' text and history." The Declaration of
Rights preceded the Federal Bill of Rights, and there is substan-
tial historical evidence of Virginia's discord with the federal pro-
tections when they were proposed.
Virginia's 1788 ratifying convention proposed forty amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution, twenty comprising a Bill of
Rights, and twenty imposing structural limitations on the federal
government." This was an Antifederalist demand that Virginia
Federalists, led by James Madison, accepted to ensure the Feder-
al Constitution's unconditional ratification in Virginia." After
Madison submitted his proposed amendments-fewer and of less
substance than those proposed by the Virginia Convention but
more similar than the resulting Federal Bill of Rights"5-before
Congress, the House of Representatives modified them and the
Senate weakened them considerably.6 0 Madison himself "objected
to the changes" wrought by the Senate." The General Assembly
54. See, e.g., McCullough, supra note 11, at 350 (quoting United States v. Payne, 492
F.2d 449, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1974) (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting)).
55. See id. at 352-53.
56. E.g., Holliday, 3 Va. App. at 615-16, 352 S.E.2d at 364.
57. Hylton, supra note 2, at 439-40 (citing 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 657-62 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1886)).
58. Id. at 438. Antifederalist leaders including Patrick Henry, George Mason, and
William Grayson hoped to avert ratification of the Federal Constitution until it could be
amended. Id. at 436-37.
59. Among the provisions not found in the final Bill of Rights, Madison proposed a
right to a jury of one's vicinage, a double jeopardy protection regardless of whether the
penalty was "life or limb," a clear individual right to keep and bear arms, a clear individu-
al right to speak, write, or publish sentiments, a clarified definition of prohibited estab-
lishment, express separation of powers, clarification that the people have an absolute right
to reform or change government when it becomes abusive, and foundational language that
the Federal Constitution derived its power from the people and existed for the benefit of
life, liberty, property, happiness, and safety. Compare 1 ANNALS OF CONG. (1789) 433-36
(Joseph Galas ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James Madison), with U.S. CONST. amend. I-
X, and infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
60. Hylton, supra note 2, at 449 (citing W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES 399-401 (1891) (letter from Richard Henry Lee to Pat-
rick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789))).
61. Id. at 450.
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was dismayed when Congress forwarded the twelve altered
amendments for approval in 1789." The principal drafter of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason's disappointment
significantly undermines the purported close connection with the
Federal Bill of Rights. While other Antifederalists were more at-
tentive to the relationship between federal power and states'
rights, he "was primarily concerned with the protection of the lib-
erties of individuals."" The General Assembly's anger eventually
subsided for tepid acceptance, but two years passed before it fi-
nally approved the Federal Bill of Rights." It did so with little
celebration or fanfare."
Although many Antifederalists' criticisms addressed the rela-
tionship between the states and the federal government,66 per
ceived individual rights weaknesses may be understood by com-
paring the Virginia Convention's proposed amendments with the
Virginia Declaration of Rights and, in turn, the ratified Federal
Bill of Rights. The state senate's initial rejection of Congress' pro-
posed amendments provides additional support. The Virginia
Convention's first seven amendments were substantively similar
to the first seven sections of the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
and they are not found in the Federal Bill of Rights.67 Those pro-
visions announced that men retained inherent and inalienable
rights, power is vested in and derived from the people, and gov-
ernment is instituted for the common benefit and should be re-
sisted if it becomes oppressive." Those omitted provisions an-
nounced the government's foundational political philosophy, but
there were also differences in concrete, substantive protections.
Both Virginia's proposed amendments and Declaration of Rights
prohibited "exclusive or seperate [sic] public emoluments or privi-
leges," expressly provided for a separation of powers, set forth
62. Id. at 450-51.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. See id. at 456, 460.
65. See id. at 460.
66. See id. at 450-51.
67. Compare id. app. 1 at 467-68, and VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ I-VII (1776),
with U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
68. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 467, with VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS H§
I-III (1776).
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basic suffrage rights, and denied the government power to sus-
pend laws without legislative action.69 The Federal Bill of Rights
included none of those provisions.
Of the twenty individual rights amendments proposed by the
Virginia Convention, only twelve included protections similar to
those found in the Federal Bill of Rights.o The Virginia Conven-
tion's proposed amendments bore closer resemblance to the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights. Noticeable differences between the
Federal Bill of Rights and Virginia's proposed amendments and
Declaration of Rights included Virginia's trial right to a jury of
the defendant's vicinage;" right against giving self-incriminating
"evidence," rather than merely witnessing, against oneself;72 ex-
press prohibition against general warrants;73 and protection
against standing armies and subordination of the military to civil
authority. Voting down the Sixth Amendment, the state senate
criticized its failure to clarify that defendants had a right to trial
by a jury of their vicinage." Although they were not in the Virgin-
ia Declaration of Rights, the Virginia Convention's proposed
amendments also included an express right of "the people" "to
keep and bear arms"" as well as a definition of prohibited estab-
lishment, which were both absent from the Federal Bill of
Rights. The state senate targeted the First Amendment, voting it
down and asserting that its protection against establishment was
insufficient and might permit Congress to support certain faiths
with tax revenue. Virginia's proposed amendments included pro-
tections that were stronger and better defined than those found
in the Federal Bill of Rights. Although the Virginia Declaration of
69. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 467-68 (alteration in original), with VA.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ IV-VII (1776).
70. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 468-69, and VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
§§ VIII-XVI (1776), with U.S. CONST. amend. I-VIII.
71. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 468, and VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §
VIII (1776), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 468, and VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §
VIII (1776), with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 468-69, and VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
§ X (1776), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 469, and VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §
XIII (1776), with U.S. CONST. amend. H.
75. Hylton, supra note 2, at 455.
76. Compare id. app. 1 at 469, with U.S. CONST. amend. II, and VA. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS § XIII (1776).
77. Compare Hylton, supra note 2, app. 1 at 469, with U.S. CONST. amend. I, and VA.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVI (1776).
78. Hylton, supra note 2, at 455.
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Rights, in some measure, influenced the Federal Bill of Rights,
Virginians considered the Federal Bill of Rights a weakened pro-
tection for rights they sought to preserve through their conven-
tion's proposed amendments. The relationship between Virginia's
Declaration of Rights was closer to the Virginia Convention's pro-
posed amendments, which were not fully realized in the Federal
Bill of Rights.
This historical analysis is offered merely to rebut assertions
that history justifies coextension. Neither the provisions' legisla-
tive histories nor the convention members' viewpoints can dictate
the constitution's interpretation; they are irrelevant to that anal-
ysis." The constitution is properly interpreted according to its
text and historical and common law background."o
D. Independent Interpretation's Possible Return
The Supreme Court of Virginia has given slight indication that
it might depart from coextensive interpretation. In this year's
Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth decision, a unanimous court
observed that the Virginia and federal speech and press protec-
tions were "virtually identical" and cited, with parenthetical quo-
tation, a case stating that the provisions were "co-extensive."
But the Daily Press court, itself, did not declare them coextensive.
Instead, the court offered a qualification: "[F]or purposes of this
opinion, we make no distinction between them."82 In this case, the
qualification meant that analysis under either constitution would
reach the same result. This is closer to the Virginia courts' tradi-
tional approach, which, in appropriate cases, recognized that the
Virginia and federal constitutions independently reached the
same result." The logical consequence is that a different case may
implicate a distinction between the two constitutions and require
the court to interpret and apply the Virginia Constitution accord-
ing to its own, independent meaning. This subtle distinction con-
79. See 4C MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE § 18 (Repl. Vol. 2006) [hereinafter MICHIE'S] (cit-
ing Funkhouser v. Spahr, 102 Va. 306, 312-13, 46 S.E. 378, 380 (1904); Sherwood v. Atl. &
D.R. Co., 94 Va. 291, 301-02, 26 S.E. 943, 946 (1897)).
80. See infra Part II.A.1.
81. Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447, 454 n.7, 739 S.E.2d 636, 640 n.7
(2013) (citing Black v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 764, 785, 553 S.E.2d 738, 750 (2001) (Has-
sell, C.J., dissenting), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 538 U.S. 343 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id.
83. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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veyed a fundamentally different understanding from the court of
appeals' broad declaration" and even the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's narrower endorsement of coextension." It may foretell a
return to the Virginia Constitution's independent interpretation,
universally applied.
II. DISTINCT TEXT
Certain provisions in the Virginia and federal constitutions are
textually similar but nonetheless distinct. This distinction is im-
portant because interpretation begins with the text." Proper tex-
tual interpretation contradicts coextension and further reveals
that the Virginia and federal constitutions have different mean-
ings."
A. Rules of Interpretation
The Virginia and federal courts' different approaches to consti-
tutional interpretation magnify the differences in the constitu-
tions' text. The federal judiciary's more flexible interpretation re-
sults in the periodic emergence of new constitutional doctrines,
but Virginia courts' well-established rules ensure the Virginia
Constitution's constancy, save for amendment by the people.
84. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
86. See Quesinberry v. Hull, 159 Va. 270, 274-75, 165 S.E. 382, 383 (1932) (quoting 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 451, at
436-37 (1833)); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAw: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 53-54, 56, 69, 403-04 (2012); see also Howard, supra note 12, at 935-36.
Professor Howard lists several guiding "factors" for state judges' interpretation of state
constitutions-the text, the legislative history, the state's history, and the "subject matter
in litigation and the interests affected by the local political process." Id. at 935-37. He de-
notes no hierarchy, but the text must come first, compare id., with Quesinberry, 159 Va. at
274-75, 165 S.E. at 383 (citation omitted), and legislative history has no bearing. 4C
MICHIE'S, supra note 79, § 18 (citing Funkhouser v. Spahr, 102 Va. 306, 312-13, 46 S.E.
378, 380 (1904); Sherwood v. Atl. & D.R. Co., 94 Va. 291, 301-02, 26 S.E. 943, 946 (1897)).
87. This discussion interprets the coextensive provisions' text, but it does not attempt
a full interpretation of each provision's application in every instance. The courts must ap-
ply the Virginia Constitution's text, with the assistance of history and precedent, to each
case's facts. McCullough, supra note 11, at 357.
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1. Virginia Rules
Virginia courts have long adhered to traditional rules of consti-
tutional interpretation." With coextension's exception, they have
applied these rules consistently, and time has only enshrined
them." The Virginia courts generallyo interpret "every word" of
the constitution "in its plain, obvious, common sense,"" according
to the meaning contemporary to its enactment." The constitution
is "construed as a whole, and every section, phrase and word giv-
en effect and harmonized if possible."" When appropriate, text
may be interpreted according to its meaning as a term of art.94
Extrinsic evidence may assist its interpretation when the consti-
tution's meaning is ambiguous." In those instances, courts may
resort to "the history of the times and . . . the state of things exist-
88. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 68 (1793) (Tucker, J.); Com-
monwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 11-13 (1782) (Wythe, J.).
89. See 17 MICHIE'S, supra note 79, § 4 (citing May v. Sherrard, 115 Va. 617, 625, 79
S.E. 1026, 1028 (1913)) ("The fact that a case is old does not affect its value or authority,
and where it appears to have been carefully considered and well supported by authority
and is in accord with modern decisions in other states, it should not be regarded as over-
ruled by a subsequent case in conflict therewith which makes no reference to it, and in
which the question decided does not appear to have been carefully considered.").
90. Coextensive interpretation is the exception. Its own existence contradicts Virgin-
ia's rules of interpretation by applying different rules for different constitutional provi-
sions. See Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 226-27, 72 S.E.2d 506, 510-11 (1952) (citations
omitted).
91. Orion Sporting Grp., LLC v. Board of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195, 196 (2005)
(Amherst County) (quoting Farinholt v. Luckhard, 90 Va. 936, 937, 21 S.E. 817, 817
(1886)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Town of Galax v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 177 Va. 29, 32, 12 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1941) ("Constitutions were adopted to pro-
tect the people against their own rash actions. Their plain mandates should not be disre-
garded because conditions change, not because new concepts of economic problems may
give rise to a desire to overcome the barriers erected. Nor do exigent circumstances justify
judicial sophistry as a means to circumvent them. There is an orderly process ordained for
the amendment of objectionable provisions.").
92. See Blake v. Marshall, 152 Va. 616, 625 148 SE. 789, 791 (1929) ('The contempo-
raneous construction placed upon constitutional limitations is significant, even though not
always decisive."); e.g., Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 741-42, 109 S.E. 582, 586-87
(1921) (citing Bracey v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 867, 871-72, 89 S.E. 144, 145 (1916);
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 694, 701 (1828); Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449, 450-51 (1824)).
93. Dean, 194 Va. at 226, 72 S.E.2d at 511 (citations omitted); see also Miller v. Ayres,
213 Va. 251, 267, 191 S.E.2d 261, 273 (1972), quoted in Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516,
521 (4th Cir. 1986).
94. E.g., Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 750, 754-55, 107 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1959); cf. Carter
v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 116, 125, 562 S.E.2d 331, 335 (2002) (quoting Stein v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 65, 69, 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991)).
95. 4C Michie's, supra note 79, § 18.
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ing when the [constitutional provision] was ... adopted."" Addi-
tionally, courts may rely on constitutional provisions' common
law background to assist their interpretation.9 7
Legislative history and the convention's views are irrelevant.9 8
These well-established rules respect the people's convention and
amendment powers over the Commonwealth's fundamental law."
2. Federal Approaches
The federal courts have employed more flexible construction.
Traditionally, they adhered to established rules of interpreta-
tion.'o The federal courts have strayed from these rules from time
to time. Critics have identified "activism" under living constitu-
tionalism,'o originalism,10 2 and other "cosmic" constitutional theo-
96. Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 787, 91 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1956) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). For authorities providing more discussion and evidence of
the Virginia Constitution's historical background, see generally DINAN, supra note 11;
HOWARD, supra note 22, and BLACKSTONE, supra note 1. Professor Dinan's work provides
the most recent update, while Professor Howard's work provides comprehensive back-
ground material for Virginia's 1971 constitution. For provisions original to the 1776 Decla-
ration of Rights and Plan of Government, St. George Tucker's edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries provides helpful historical and common law background.
97. 40 MICHIE'S, supra note 79, § 14 (citing Dean, 194 Va. at 226, 72 S.E.2d at 510-
11; Va. & Sw. Ry. Co. v. Clower's Admx., 102 Va. 867, 872-73, 47 S.E. 1003, 1004 (1904)).
98. Id. § 18 (citing Funkhouser v. Spahr, 102 Va. 306, 312-13, 46 S.E. 378, 380 (1904);
Sherwood v. Atl. & D.R. Co., 94 Va. 291, 301-02, 26 S.E. 943, 946 (1897)).
99. Compare VA. CONST. art. I, § 3, and id., art. XII, §§ 1-2, with Town of Galax v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 177 Va. 29, 32, 12 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1941) ("There is an or-
derly process ordained for the amendment of objectionable provisions."). See also Staples v.
Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 623, 33 S.E.2d 49, 53 (1945) (per curiam) (citing 1 THOMAS M.
COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 84 (8th ed. 1927)) ("The peo-
ple have the unlimited power to control and alter their Constitution, subject only to such
limitations and restraints as may be imposed by the Constitution of the United States.");
W. Hamilton Bryson, Judicial Independence in Virginia, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 705
(2004) ("The political will of the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia is expressed in
the Constitution of Virginia, which created the government of Virginia.").
100. E.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) ("The Constitution
is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when
adopted, it means now.'); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 178-80 (1803); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,
it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them .... ).
101. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 32 (2012); see also
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 86, at 403-04.
102. See WILKINSON, supra note 101, at 46. Nothing suggests ulterior motives in Vir-
ginia courts' adherence to well-established rules of interpretation. That approach cannot
be considered activist.
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ries.o3 Whatever the label, federal Justices and judges have con-
structed meaning based on "penumbras,""o' public policy,a5 unde-
fined theories of justice, 0 foreign law,' perceived popular senti-
ment or evolving standards,0 ' debatable historical reading,o' and
so forth to depart from the Federal Constitution's textual mean-
ing.no Despite the array of approaches, the federal courts have
moved closer to more traditional rules than in the recent past,"
and they might approach a uniform application of those rules.1 2
103. See id. at 70, 103, 116 (discrediting political process theory, pragmatism, and oth-
er attempts at cosmic constitutional theory).
104. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
105. E.g., WILKINSON, supra note 101, at 28-29 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 81-82 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
106. E.g., id. at 20 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
107. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 572-73 (2003). Contra Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29
HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 291, 313 (2005) ("Foreign and international laws, other than
treaties ratified by the United States, are not enumerated among the three kinds of law
that can be 'the supreme Law of the Land.' Therefore, they should not be treated as out-
come-determinative in constitutional adjudication.").
108. Cf. WILKINSON, supra note 101, at 25 (discussing Justice Brennan's opposition to
capital punishment based on "evolving standards of decency," contradicted by his contin-
ued opposition even when evolving standards favored it); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. _,
-, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470-75 (2012) (similarly avoiding the question whether objective
indicia show a national conscience opposed to the form of punishment when the Court op-
posed the majority view among jurisdictions). Contra Miller, 567 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at
2487 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Is it true that our society is inexorably evolving in the direc-
tion of greater and greater decency? Who says so, and how did this particular philosophy
of history find its way into our fundamental law? And in any event, aren't elected repre-
sentatives more likely than unaccountable judges to reflect changing societal standards?").
109. Cf., e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 101, at 47-49.
110. Properly, the people retain the power to change the Federal Constitution, whether
by convention or amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. art. V, and id. amend. X, with Sturges
v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 133 (1819).
111. The Hon. D. Arthur Kelsey, The Resurgent Role of Legal History in Modern U.S.
Supreme Court Cases, 37 VBA NEWS J. 10, 11, 13 (2010); see WILKINSON, supra note 101,
at 31 ("It is a stinging indictment of living constitutionalism that the ranks of its disciples
on the bench have become so thin. The theory has proven a bit much for even the more
liberal members of the present Court."); cf. Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 871
(4th Cir. 2001) (Luttig, J., concurring) ("[That the intellectual scrupulousness of conven-
tional jurisprudence (i.e., the painstaking determination of law from precedent and the
meticulous application of that law to the particular facts of the litigation), and the result-
ing accountability, does serve as a bridle upon the courts is, together with the fact that it
demands more of the intellect, precisely why this scrupulousness has been eschewed in
many quarters in favor of the intellectually lazier and jurisprudentially misbegotten en-
terprise of decision by personal policy preference.").
112. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 86, at 413-14; Kelsey, supra note 111, at 11, 13;
Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Reply, Self-Incrimination and the Constitution: A
Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1995) ("[C]onstitu-
tional law should, ideally, bear some relation to, well, the Constitution.").
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These shifting trends render legal interpretation and comparison
less predictable and less certain.
B. Textual Interpretation
Textual interpretation demonstrates that the Virginia and fed-
eral constitutions use different language and carry different
meanings. This is coextension's most glaring flaw because legal
interpretation begins with the text."' The textual meaning does
not change, and it is the most consistent and authoritative guide
for interpretation. Additionally, the federal courts' construction of
the Federal Constitution does change,"' and varying federal con-
struction may yield different interpretation even when the federal
and Virginia constitutions are textually indistinct.
1. Inherent Rights
Article I, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution provides
[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of so-
ciety, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity;
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquir-
ing and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety. 115
The Federal Constitution includes no similar text; however, Vir-
ginia courts have considered article I, section 10 to be coextensive
with federal substantive due process,116 which the Supreme Court
113. The interpretation that follows references general and legal dictionaries, Almond
v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 425-26, 89 S.E.2d 851, 855-56 (1955); S. Ry. Co. v. City of Richmond,
175 Va. 308, 315, 8 S.E.2d 271, 274 (1940) (quoting Quesinberry v. Hull, 159 Va. 270, 274,
165 S.E. 382, 383 (1932)); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 86, at 73, and, when appropriate,
the common law background to ascertain the provisions' meaning, Farinholt v. Luckhard,
90 Va. 936, 938, 21 S.E. 817, 817 (1886) (citations omitted); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
86, at 69, contemporary to the their ratification or enactment, Blake v. Marshall, 152 Va.
616, 625, 148 SE. 789, 791 (1929); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 86, at 78-80. The United
States Constitution was ratified by sufficient state conventions and took force in 1789, the
Bill of Rights in 1791, and the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The original Virginia Con-
stitution was instituted by convention in 1776. Although the present Virginia Constitution
was ratified in 1971, many of the provisions discussed in this comment were in the origi-
nal Declaration of Rights. Several alterations have been made over the years, and they
will be interpreted according to the year of their inclusion.
114. See McCullough, supra note 11, at 353.
115. VA. CONST. art. I, § 1. This provision is original to the 1776 Declaration of Rights.
Compare id., with VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1(1776).
116. Paris v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 377, 383, 545 S.E.2d 557, 560 (2001). But see
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of the United States based on the Due Process Clause's prohibi-
tion against deprivation of liberty without due process."
These meanings do not correspond. The Due Process Clause
speaks only to the appropriate process for deprivation of liberty,"'
but "substantive due process" protects liberty from state action,
no matter how much process is given." 9 Without any textual or
historical basis, substantive due process is open to considerable
judicial construction. Article I, section 1 identifies natural rights
that the Virginia people retained under the constitution and
which the government may not infringe. Those rights include "en-
joyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and pos-
sessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safe-
ty."'20 Article I, section 1 employs ambiguous language, amenable
to loose and divergent construction by the courts,"' but its mean-
ing derives from Lockean natural law and social contract princi-
ples"' and is substantially similar to Blackstone's "absolute
rights.""' Blackstone described the three principal absolute rights
of Englishmen: "personal security,"124 "personal liberty,"' and
"property." 6 Virginia courts applying article I, section 1 should
construe it according to its text and background in Lockean theo-
ry and the common law understanding of absolute rights.
Article I, section 1 addresses substantive rights rather than
procedural protections. No text in the Federal Constitution con-
fers these rights, but even substantive due process' construction
provides fundamentally different analyses and outcomes from ar-
ticle I, section 1's text and background.127
Gray v. Rhoads, 55 Va. Cir. 362, 368-69 (2001) (City of Charlottesville) (interpreting arti-
cle I, section 1 independently to find that the provision was not self-executing).
117. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 545-46.
118. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); McManama v. Plunk, 250
Va. 27, 34, 458 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1995); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 541-42 (1997); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980).
119. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 546.
120. VA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
121. See 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 64-69.
122. See id. at 58-65.
123. Compare VA. CONST. art. I, § 1, with 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 123-40.
124. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 129-34.
125. Id. at 135-38.
126. Id. at 138-40.
127. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-79 (2003), and MacDonald v.
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2. Speedy Trial
The Virginia Constitution confers to criminal defendants "the
right to a speedy ... trial."" This language is original to the 1776
Virginia Declaration of Rights.2 9 The Sixth Amendment similarly
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy .. . trial.""'o Although the text is exactly the
same, the implications are similarly uncertain and open to con-
struction. The General Assembly and Congress have enacted
statutes to enforce these protections. 3 1
3. Self-Incrimination
Under article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution, no per-
son may "be compelled in any criminal proceeding to give evi-
dence against himself."132 The language "in any criminal proceed-
ing" did not appear in the 1776 Declaration of Rights, but it was
added in the 1902 Virginia Constitution."3 Under the Federal
Constitution, no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself."134 These provisions have two
substantive textual differences.
First, article I, section 8 addresses "any criminal proceeding"
and the Fifth Amendment, "any criminal case." In 1902, legal
"proceedings" were understood in both a "general" and "narrow[]"
sense.'3 Generally, they were "the form in which actions [we]re to
be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of
conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judg-
ments, and of executing."" 6 In a narrower sense, they constituted
"any act, in the course of an action, done to achieve a given
Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 156, 164-67 (4th Cir. 2013), with VA. CONST. art. I, § 1, and 5
BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 215-16. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring),
with VA. CONST. art. I, § 1, and 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 129.
128. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
129. Compare id., with VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § VIII (1776).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
131. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum.
Supp. 2013).
132. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
133. See SAM N. HURST, AN ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 5, 7 (1903).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
135. WALTER A. SHUMAKER & GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF, THE CYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF LAW 729 (1901).
136. Id.
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end."' From each definition, it is apparent that "legal proceed-
ings" involved the formal, procedural phases of litigation, from in-
itial filing to final order, or procedural phases of a grand jury
hearing or investigation. When the Federal Bill of Rights was
drafted and ratified, the ordinary legal meaning of "case" was the
mere potential for an action, the "cause of complaint."'8 A "case"
came into being when the cause of action accrued or, in the crimi-
nal context, when the alleged crime occurred. The primary differ-
ence between these two texts is that the Virginia right attaches
upon formal procedure and the federal right upon the underlying
facts. Article I, section 8, by its plain meaning, targets a narrower
scope of the criminal process. The Fifth Amendment's text pro-
vides a broader protection. The right attaches before formal pro-
ceedings and may, therefore, include investigations and inter-
views.
Second, article I, section 8 protects a person from "giv[ing] evi-
dence against himself," and the Fifth Amendment protects a per-
son from "be[ing] a witness against himself." In 1776, "evidence"
included "some proof, by testimony of men on oath, or by writings
or records."'" Article I, section 8 is broad enough to encompass
physical and demonstrative evidence as well as witness testimo-
ny. The Fifth Amendment is narrower. "Witness" denotes "testi-
mony of witnesses," excluding physical or demonstrative evi-
dence.'40 The Fifth Amendment's plain text protects persons from
testifying against themselves, not from producing documents,
records, or other physical or demonstrative proofs. Article I, sec-
tion 8's text protects persons from producing those materials.
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected a broader in-
terpretation of "evidence" before the state and federal rights were
declared coextensive, that decision rested on the purpose and his-
tory of self-incrimination rights'4 1-not textual interpretation.
137. Id.
138. See RICHARD BURN, A NEw LAW DICTIONARY 143 (1792) ("[T]he plaintiffs whole
case or cause of complaint is set forth at length in the original writ.. .. [T]he party injured
is allowed to bring a special action on his case . . . .").
139. GIEs JACOB, A NEw LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1772).
140. See BURN, supra note 138, at 320-21 ("[Evidence] containeth also the testimony of
witnesses ... . Evidence is of two kinds, written evidence, and the evidence of witnesses.").
141. Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 682, 133 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1963) ("The his-
tory and purpose of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination provided by § 8
show that it is to protect an accused against the employment of legal process to extract
from his lips an admission of his guilt, and it does not extend beyond testimonial compul-
sion.").
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Further, the court was incorrect in stating that the right's pur-
pose and history confined "evidence" to testimony. First, the text
evinces the provision's purpose,142 and it plainly prohibits com-
pelled evidence whether it is testimonial, demonstrative, or phys-
ical, including written or recorded materials. Second, there is
considerable evidence that article I, section 8's history is con-
sistent with its plain, textual meaning. It is consistent with En-
tick v. Carrington,4 3 a "monument of English freedom" with
which "every American statesman, during our revolutionary and
formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar."'" Entick
addressed several King's messengers searching a person's prem-
ises and seizing of his private papers to be used as evidence
against him.'45 Presiding over the case, Lord Camden discussed
the search and seizure as an invalid execution of a general war-
rant,"' but also found that the messengers impermissibly com-
pelled the plaintiff to incriminate himself. ' The text and history
do not support the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision, much
less a coextensive interpretation of article I, section 8.
Textually, the Fifth Amendment is broader in its attachment
but narrower in the scope of its protection. In a criminal proceed-
ing, investigation, or the underlying events, it protects persons
from testifying against themselves. There is textual support for
this broad attachment, but modern precedent has found other
grounds to support it.'
Article I, section 8's text is narrower in its attachment but of-
fers broader protections. After a criminal indictment, writ, infor-
mation, or complaint has been filed or a grand jury hearing or in-
vestigation has begun, it protects the person from testifying or
142. South Hill v. Allen, 177 Va. 154, 164, 12 S.E.2d 770, 773-74 (1941).
143. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 19 How. St. Tri. 1029.
144. Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886), overruled on other grounds as
stated in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Alt-
hough the Fifth Amendment's text does not reflect that historical importance, article I,
section 8 does, and this history is more appropriate in its context that the Fifth Amend-
ment's.
145. 95 Eng. Rep. at 807-08; 19 How. St. Tri. at 1030.
146. Id. at 812, 818; 19 How. St. Tri. at 1030, 1072-73.
147. Id. at 818; 19 How. St. Tri. at 1073.
148. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58, 467 (1966), with supra note
138 and accompanying text. But see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) ("But
the question of the right of the State to withdraw the privilege against self-incrimination
is not here involved. The compulsion to which the quoted statements refer is that of the
processes of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and required to testi-
fy. Compulsion by torture to extort a confession is a different matter.").
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producing any incriminating documents, records, or other physi-
cal or demonstrative proofs against himself. It retains the tradi-
tional protection for private papers, 4 9 which neither the Fifth
Amendment's text nor recent case law include."o
4. Double Jeopardy
Article I, section 8 of the Virginia Constitution protects persons
from "be[ing] put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.""' The
Federal Constitution provides that no person may "be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."12 The
only substantive difference is the Federal Constitution's qualifi-
cation that jeopardy is "of life or limb.""' The federal prohibition
plainly signifies that the right against double jeopardy applies on-
ly for crimes punishable by dismemberment or death-where life
or limb is in danger. There is, however, evidence that "life or
limb" was a legal term of art. Sir Edward Coke used the "nearly
identical words 'life or member"' as a legal term of art for felony
offenses."4 The federal courts have not recognized this qualifica-
tion since 1873,' but proper textual interpretation would import
149. Cf. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625-30; Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; 19 How. St. Tri. at
1073; Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seri-
ously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1987).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8. This provision first appeared in the 1902 Virginia Constitu-
tion. DINAN, supra note 12, at 49.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
153. See HURST, supra note 133, at 7 ("[The provision] extends not only to 'life and
limb,' but to all criminal cases."). The meaning of "jeopardy" did not change over time. A
1901 legal dictionary defined it as "[p]eril; danger," SHUMAKER & LONGSDORF, supra note
135, at 503, and a general 1785 dictionary as "[h]azard; danger; [pleril," 1 SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE m (6th ed. 1785).
154. The Hon. Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., The Case of Ex Parte Lange (or How the
Double Jeopardy Clause Lost Its "Life or Limb'), 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 65-66 (1999).
155. See id. at 55 (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 172-73 (1873)). Before
Lange, the Double Jeopardy Clause's most authoritative and comprehensive interpretation
came from Justice Story, sitting on the federal circuit. Id. at 70. United States v. Gilbert
recognized the "life or limb" qualification, but the court relied on the Double Jeopardy
Clause's common law background to interpret the qualification as a felony charge rather
than jeopardy of "life or limb." 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294-95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204).
The court chose this interpretation even after recognizing that
[i]f resort should be had to the grammatical structure and meaning of the
words, the natural interpretation would certainly seem to be, that no person
should be twice put upon trial for any offence, for which he would be liable,
upon conviction, to be punished with the loss of life limb; - for jeopardy
means hazard, danger, or peril; and when a party is put upon trial for an of-
fense punishable with the loss of life or limb, and he stands for his deliver-
ance upon the verdict of the jury, he is thereby put in jeopardy, hazard, dan-
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the distinction.156 Article I, section 8's text does not include the
qualification and plainly prohibits double jeopardy, regardless of
the charge or its maximum penalty.
5. Searches and Seizures
Article I, section 10, of the Virginia Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution address
searches and seizures. Article I, section 10 states,
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose of-
fense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
Since its inclusion in the 1776 Declaration of Rights, it has not
been changed.' The Federal Constitution announces,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 55
The most apparent difference is article I, section 10's omission
of security rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. It
mentions only the requirements for a valid warrant to search or
seize. Article I, section 10 includes no "right" to security in "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" or against "unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fourth Amendment does. Also, arti-
cle I, section 10 flatly prohibits "general warrants." The Fourth
Amendment might impliedly do so by announcing warrant re-
quirements, but the protection is not as strong as article I, section
10's prohibition.
Further inspection reveals substantive differences in the war-
rant requirements. Article I, section 10 requires "evidence of a
fact committed" for a warrant to search a suspected place. For
seizures of a person, it requires an identified and named person,
ger or peril of his life or limb.
Id. at 1294.
156. See Gilbert, 25 F. Cas. at 1294.
157. VA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
158. 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 175.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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particular description of his offense, and evidentiary support that
he committed an offense. The Fourth Amendment's text differs.
For a valid warrant, it requires only "probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation" and a particular description of the "place
to be searched" or "the persons or things to be seized." Article I,
section 10 does not require particular description of places to be
searched, but like the Fourth Amendment, it requires identifica-
tion of an actual person. The Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement of "oath or affirmation" of probable cause is similar to
the article I, section 10 requirement that evidence of the "offense"
or "act committed" support the warrant; when the Declaration of
Rights was enacted, "evidence" included "testimony of men on
oath," and a sworn or affirmed statement will suffice.160 A signifi-
cant difference arises over the offense's required description. The
Fourth Amendment only requires probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, and it does not mention the offense's descrip-
tion. In contrast, article I, section 10 requires the offense's partic-
ular description, defined as "[s]ingle, individual, relating to dis-
tinct persons or things; attentive to minute circumstances."'61 It
requires particular description of the offense instead of mere
probable cause.
Probble auseis rther162Probable cause is rather amorphous in contrast to a "particu-
larly described" offense. The Supreme Court of the United States
has stated that probable cause "is incapable of precise definition
or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabili-
ties and depends on the totality of the circumstances."6 Under
article I, section 10, a warrant to seize a person requires particu-
lar description of his offense; the description must be "[s]ingle,
individual, relating to distinct persons or things; attentive to mi-
nute circumstances."" According to article I, section 10's text, a
Virginia officer must bring more substantial evidence to obtain a
warrant to seize a person than must a federal officer.
160. JACOB, supra note 139.
161. 2 JOHN ASH, NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed.
1775).
162. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). The federal courts formerly fol-
lowed a more concrete standard, see Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523,
534-35 (1967), but its textual and historical bases were questionable.
163. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371. Compare Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)
("[Probable cause] does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more like-
ly true than false."), with 2 JOHNSON, supra note 153 (defining "probable" as "[1likely; hav-
ing more evidence than the contrary").
164. 2 ASH, supra note 161.
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6. Due Process
Virginia courts interpret Virginia and federal constitutional
guarantees of procedural due process to be coextensive."' The
Virginia Constitution provides for due process of law in two sec-
tions. Article I, section 11 reads, "That no person shall be de-
prived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."' Article I, section 11's due process clause first appeared in
the 1902 constitution but only applied to deprivation of proper-
ty."' The 1971 constitution added "life" and "liberty."66 The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments are similar to article I, section 11.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits "depriv[ation] of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," and the Fourteenth simi-
larly limits the states.'6 9 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
Due Process Clauses are textually identical to article I, section
11. They each require due process of law for any government dep-
rivation of life, liberty, or property. Under article I, section 15,
"rights cannot be enjoyed save in a society where law is respected
and due process is observed."o The language was added in 1971
and has no counterpart in the Federal Constitution."' It appears
within a larger provision that sets forth the basic political philos-
ophy of the Virginia Constitution and Virginians' rights.'7 2 It is a
reminder of the importance of due process.' Textually, these
provisions' meanings are indistinct. Construction may, however,
distinguish federal procedural due process.
165. Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2005) (citations
omitted).
166. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
167. HURST, supra note 133, at 12. Interestingly, Hurst defined due process as "re-
quir[ing] that a person shall have reasonable notice, and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard before an impartial tribunal, before any binding decree can be made affecting his
rights to liberty or property." Id. at 12. This is a narrower interpretation than federal
courts have given federal procedural due process. Compare id. at 12, with CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 6, § 7.4.1-.3, at 579-604.
168. DINAN, supra note 12, at 55.
169. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
170. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
171. 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 284.
172. See id. at 190, 284-85.
173. See id. at 190 (quoting VA. COMM'N ON CONST. REV., supra note 12, at 96).
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7. Antidiscrimination
The Virginia Constitution's article I, section 11 antidiscrimina-
tion provision ensures "that the right to be free from any govern-
mental discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race,
color, sex, or national origin shall not be abridged, except that the
mere separation of the sexes shall not be considered discrimina-
tion."'7 4 It is much more specific than the Federal Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits states from "deny[ing]
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.""7
Comparison requires analysis of the protected classifications
and the protection envisioned. Article I, section 11 announces
specific classifications, protecting persons from "discrimination
upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national
origin.""' The Equal Protection Clause's text provides no classifi-
cations, stating only that states may not deny "any person within
[their jurisdiction] equal protection of the laws."1 7 ' The Clause's
text leaves uncertain what classifications are protected, and his-
tory is the best guide for its interpretation.
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted specifically to combat
the "Black Codes" that arose following the abolition of slavery.7 1
This background suggests equal protection on the basis of race
and possibly national origin,'7 ' but neither the Equal Protection
Clause's text nor history suggest protections for classifications
based on religion or gender. According to their text and history,
article I, section 11 reaches more broadly than the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, but federal courts have construed the Clause to pro-
tect against discrimination on the basis of sex,' religion,'"' and
174. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. It first appeared in the 1971 constitution. DINAN, supra
note 12, at 58.
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
176. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
177. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
178. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 957-58, 993 (1995); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07
(1879) (describing the reasons for adopting the Fourteenth Amendment); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L.
REV. 753, 784-88 (1985).
179. See Trimible v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
180. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
181. See Olsen v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 709 F.2d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
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classifications. 8 So construed, it is the Equal Protection Clause
that reaches more broadly.
The protection envisioned is even less certain and, therefore,
less comparable. Article I, section 11's protection against discrim-
ination, "[a]n act based on prejudice," suggests a prejudicial in-
tent standard. 8 3 It might accord to the "equal protection of the
laws," but "equal protection" remains ambiguous. There is, how-
ever, historical evidence that the Equal Protection Clause guard-
ed against more than prejudicial intent. The test may have been
whether enforceable civil rights extended to all persons, regard-
less of race.'84 Under this interpretation, "equal protection" is
broader than article I, section 11's prohibition against "discrimi-
nation." Nonetheless, the Equal Protection Clause's ambiguity
and history make interpretation difficult,' and the Supreme
Court of the United States follows a prejudicial intent standard'8 6
that is not unreasonable.
According to their text and history, article I, section 11's pro-
tected classifications are broader than the Equal Protection
Clause's, but historical support suggests "equal protection" might
be broader than antidiscrimination. In this sense, article I, sec-
tion 11 attaches more broadly but targets less state action than
the Equal Protection Clause. Of course, debate over the Four-
teenth Amendment's history and basic meaning continues, 8 ' and
the Equal Protection Clause's construction beyond its textual and
historical basis is slightly broader than article I, section I1's plain
meaning.
182. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, §§ 9.5-9.6, at 766-82 (discussing protections
based on alienage and birth out of wedlock); see also Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d
169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012) (extending heightened scrutiny based on homosexuality), aff'd on
other grounds by - U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (failing to articulate specifically
whether the law was invalid on equal protection (under either heightened or rational basis
scrutiny), substantive due process, or federalism grounds).
183. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 376 (1st ed. 1969).
184. McConnell, supra note 178, at 993.
185. See id. at 951 (quoting Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 (1991)).
186. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 333 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
187. See generally, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5-and Thus of
Section 5, 126 HARv. L. REV. F. 109 (2013), available at www.harvardlawreview.org/issues
/126/Februaryl3/forum_989.php; McConnell, supra note 178.
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8. Speech, Press, Assembly and Petition
Article I, section 12 of the Virginia Constitution and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution address freedoms
of speech, press, peaceable assembly, and petition. Article I, sec-
tion 12 provides,
That the freedoms of speech and of the press are among the great
bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained except by despotic
governments; that any citizen may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; that the General Assembly shall not pass any law abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press, nor the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for the re-
dress of grievances.
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law.
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.""' They target different legislatures,
but article I, section 12's final clause is almost identical to the
First Amendment. The substantive differences arise from the
complementary language found in the Virginia Constitution. Ar-
ticle I, section 12 warns that only "despotic governments" restrain
"the freedoms of speech and of the press" and adds that "any citi-
zen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Each is
noteworthy, given their omission in the First Amendment.
Significantly, the First Amendment's text limits its application
only to Congress."'o Article I, section 12 does not encounter this
problem. First, whatever branch impedes "the freedoms of speech
and of the press" is "despotic." Second, the First Amendment's
text merely limits congressional action, but article I, section 12
goes further in defining an individual right and its scope. Citizens
188. VA. CONST. art. I, § 12. In the 1776 Declaration of Rights, this provision stated on-
ly "[tihat the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never
be restrained but by despotick governments." VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XII (1776). In
1830, it was amended to include speech and to prohibit the General Assembly from abridg-
ing either freedom. 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 252. The 1870 constitution added "that
every man could 'freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments, being always responsible
for the abuse of that right."' Id. (quoting VA. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 12). Finally in 1971,
the present constitution adopted the language regarding the rights of assembly and peti-
tion. Id. at 253.
189. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
190. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1209, 1252-56 (2010).
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may speak, write, or publish their thoughts or opinions on any
subject, but they are nonetheless answerable for abusing that
right.' This provides textual basis for an individual right, pro-
tected from any government interference. The text also supports
exceptions from protected freedom of speech and press. Among
these exceptions is obscenity. Although obscenity is not protected
"speech" under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court of the
United States has narrowed obscenity's definition and indirectly
protected it against overbroad government regulation."' Under
article I, section 12, however, abuses of speech such as obscenity,
are specifically excluded from protection."'
Article I, section 12's textual meaning provides broader and
better defined speech and press rights. The scope of those rights
is defined; they may not be abused. In contrast, the First
Amendment's plain text limits only Congress and does not ad-
dress abusive speech or press. The First Amendment's construc-
tion, however, has provided substantively similar rights as article
I, section 12. The federal courts have applied the First Amend-
ment to all branches of government,'94 and they have excluded
certain forms of expression from protected speech and press.
The principal difference between article I, section 12's plain, tex-
tual meaning and federal construction of the First Amendment
appears to be the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine, which
article I, section 12's text forecloses.
9. Arms and Militias
Arms and militias are addressed in article I, section 13 of the
Virginia Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Article I, section 13 provides
191. "[A]ny citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right." VA. CONST. art. I, § 12. "Sentiment" stood for
"[t]hought; notion; opinion." JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, JOHNSON'S AND WALKER'S ENGLISH
DICTIONARIES, COMBINED 823 (1828). "Responsible" was defined as "[a]nswerable; ac-
countable." Id. at 778. To "abuse" meant "[t]o make ill use of." Id. at 59.
192. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 11.3.4.2, at 1017, 1020-22; see also, e.g.,
McCullough, supra note 11, at 353.
193. See McCullough, supra note 11, at 353.
194. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
195. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-84 (2004) (discussing
First Amendment's coverage and boundaries). The federal courts recognized a limited
scope early in the Republic's history. See United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639
(C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (Chase, J.); Fries, 9 F. Cas. (3 Dall. 515) 826, 839-40
(C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126) (Iredell, J.).
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[t]hat a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free
state, therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be
avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military
should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
196power.
The 1776 Declaration of Rights did not include "the right . . . to
keep and bear arms;" it was added in the 1971 Virginia Constitu-
tion.'97 The Second Amendment states, "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."'" Article I,
section 13 provides more substance and elaboration on rights re-
garding arms, militias, and standing armies.
The Second Amendment does not discuss the dangers of stand-
ing armies or the need for civil authority over the military. The
Declaration of Rights plainly included them.199 Owing to its 1971
update, article I, section 13 also clarifies a right that is open to
construction in the Second Amendment. The Second Amend-
ment's text is ambiguous whether the right "to keep and bear
arms" is qualified by service in the militia or is a consequence of a
free state's need for a "well regulated Militia."20' History may sim-
ilarly lead to different conclusions.20 ' Article I, section 8 does not
have this problem. It links the free state's safe defense by a
trained militia to the people's right to keep and bear arms, free
from infringement. The word "therefore" makes this right an in-
dependent and necessary consequence of the free state's need for
a safe defense. It provides an individual right. Article I, section
13's individual right to keep and bear arms is plainer than the
federal right, which required extrinsic historical analysis to an-
nounce it.202 The substantive differences are article I, section 13's
better defined individual right to keep and bear arms, protection
196. VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
197. DINAN, supra note 12, at 64.
198. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
199. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII (1776).
200. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-600 (2008), with id. at
640-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. WILKINSON, supra note 101, at 58.
202. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 598 ("We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with
an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfect-
ly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have de-
scribed above."). The Virginia Constitution's plain text is sufficient to reach the same con-
clusion.
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against standing armies, and the military's subordination to civil
authority.
The federal courts' Second Amendment interpretation follows a
textual analysis assisted by historical reference.2 0 Considering
the relatively short history of Second Amendment precedent as
well as the present push for innovative limitations on the right to
keep and bear arms, the Second Amendment's further explication
awaits future cases and controversies. It remains to be seen
whether the Second Amendment's explication accords to article I,
section 13's plain, textual meaning. At present, those rights to
keep and bear arms are similar, but article I, section 13 is sub-
stantively broader in prohibiting standing armies during peace-
time and subordinating the military to civil authority.
10. Religious Freedom and Establishment
Several provisions of the Virginia and federal constitutions dis-
cuss religion.20' Of those, the Virginia courts have interpreted ar-
ticle I, section 16 as parallel and coextensive with the First
Amendment's protection of religious freedom and prohibition
against religious establishment." Article I, section 16's first sen-
tence is original to the 1776 Declaration of Rights:20
That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the man-
ner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled
to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience;
and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbear-
ance, love, and charity towards each other.0
The remaining two sentences were added in the 1830 constitu-
tion and "draw heavily" from the 1786 Virginia Statute for Reli-
gious Freedom:208
203. See id.; see also United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 978-82 (4th Cir.
2012); United States v. Weaver, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29613, at *10-14 (S.D. W. Va. Mar.
7, 2012) (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467-68 (4th Cir. 2010)).
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI; id. amend. I; VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 16; id. art. IV, § 16; id.
art. X, § 6. Article I, section 11's antidiscrimination provision is discussed supra Part
II.B.7.
205. See Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 260 Va. 608, 626-27, 528 S.E.2d 682, 691 (2000);
Denny v. Prince, 68 Va. Cir. 339, 344 (2005) (City of Portsmouth); see also Demmon v.
Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 689, 693 (E.D. Va. 2003).
206. DINAN, supra note 12, at 67.
207. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
208. DINAN, supra note 12, at 67.
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No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious wor-
ship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, re-
strained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall oth-
erwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but all
men shall be free to profess and by argument to maintain their opin-
ions in matters of religion, and the same shall in nowise diminish,
enlarge, or affect their civil capacities. And the General Assembly
shall not prescribe any religious test whatever, or confer any peculi-
ar privileges or advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any
law requiring or authorizing any religious society, or the people of
any district within this Commonwealth, to levy on themselves or
others, any tax for the erection or repair of any house of public wor-
ship, or for the support of any church or ministry; but it shall be left
free to every person to select his religious instructorio and to make for
his support such private contract as he shall please. 9
In contrast to article I, section 16's detail, the First Amendment
merely states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.""o
The differences are similar to those found in the speech and
press clauses. First, the First Amendment's text applies only to
Congress. Article I, section 16 limits the General Assembly from
specific legislative acts, but it includes additional protections tar-
geting all government branches. The first two sentences and the
second sentence's final clause are written in the passive voice.
They address individual rights the government may not infringe
upon, and they limit all branches. The First Amendment's text
targets only congressional action.
Second, article I, section 16's protections are specified, but the
First Amendment's ambiguity leaves it open to construction. Arti-
cle I, section 16's elaboration comes from the two sentences added
in 1830. The first prohibits compelled attendance and worship as
well as persecution for religious opinions or beliefs. It also pro-
tects civil freedom to profess and maintain opinions on religion.
The second prohibits the General Assembly from requiring reli-
gious tests, privileging any religious organization, or levying tax-
es to benefit religious organizations; it also provides that persons
are free to choose and support their faith. This is considerably
more specific than the First Amendment's prohibition against
laws "respecting an establishment of religion" or "prohibiting the
209. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 16; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (reciting
the January 16, 1786 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom).
210. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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free exercise [of religion]." "Establishment" most closely signified
a "[s]ettled regulation; form; model of a government or family" as
in, "[e]stablishment by which all men should be contained in du-
ty."21 Without elaboration, containing persons in religious duty
remains abstract and amenable to construction that might ex-
pand or contract religious protections. Understood as a term of
art, however, "establishment" "buttress[ed]" the Free Exercise
Clause and required congressional neutrality toward different
faiths, one consequence being the prohibition of a national
church.212 The term of art is helpful in interpreting the Estab-
lishment Clause, but the First Amendment remains narrower
and less defined in its textual application. Article I, section 16's
text protects specific rights against legislative and other govern-
mental actions.
Federal construction has broadened the First Amendment's
application to all branches of government.2 13 It has also resulted
in an expanded Establishment Clause that narrows the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. The courts now construe the First Amendment to
prohibit private religious expression through sectarian prayer
that might convey government endorsement in public forums in-
cluding public school football games,214 public school graduation
ceremonies,21 and legislative proceedings.' Religious establish-
ment no longer means binding all persons in religious duty or
showing preferential treatment; it extends to government allow-
ance of private persons' religious expression that might subtly
convey an endorsement of those expressed sentiments.21 7 Under
the First Amendment's textual interpretation, this must consti-
tute protected free exercise of religion-not establishment.
Construction is not the only culprit; the First Amendment's
limited textual elaboration renders it more amenable to construc-
211. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 153, at dccxviii.
212. Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 73, 138 (2005).
213. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (discussing the Free
Exercise Clause's application to the executive), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
214. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
215. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
216. E.g., Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted
_ U.S. _, - S. Ct. - (May 20, 2013); Joyner v. Forsyth, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied - U.S. -, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). See generally Robert Luther, "Disparate
Impact" and the Establishment Clause, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 529 (2012).
217. E.g., Santa FeIndep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308.
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tion-especially when compared with article I, section 16. Article
I, section 16 is much less amenable to this construction. It per-
mits persons to invoke religious language or prayer in the public
sphere: "[A]ll men shall be free to profess and by argument to
maintain their opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall
in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."2 Ar-
ticle I, section 16 itself refers to "our Creator" and our mutual du-
ties of "Christian forbearance, love, and charity."2" Article I, sec-
tion 16 provides stronger free exercise guarantees than the First
Amendment's federal construction, but they may not be effected
because they are superseded as prohibited establishment under
federal precedent.220
Article I, section 16 plainly defines what government acts are
prohibited, and it even prohibits government acts in excess of the
First Amendment's prohibition against "establishment" in its
plain, textual sense or as a term of art. Article I, section 16 clari-
fies Virginians' rights in a way that the First Amendment's text
does not, in a way that flatly contradicts the trend in federal con-
struction of using the Establishment Clause to narrow free exer-
cise.
C. Different Meanings
The coextensive provisions' textual examination alone reveals
that the Virginia and federal constitutions provide substantively
different protections. Provisions addressing inherent rights, self-
incrimination, double jeopardy, warrant requirements for seizure
of a person, and protections against standing armies are plainly
distinct.22 ' Additional Virginia provisions describe protections
more specifically than the Federal Constitution, and they are less
amenable to construction than the federal provisions. Those pro-
tections include antidiscrimination, speech and press, arms and
militias, and religious freedom and establishment.22 2 Provisions
addressing speedy trial and due process have textually indistinct
meanings.
218. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
219. Id.
220. See infra Part III.A.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. See supra Part II.B.
2013] 453
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Given that the federal courts do not apply uniform rules of in-
terpretation, the textual meaning will not always govern analysis
of the Federal Constitution. In some instances, flexible methods
might construe the Federal Constitution's textually distinct pro-
tections similarly to plain, textual interpretation of the Virginia
Constitution; however, that does not warrant coextensive inter-
pretation. The Virginia and federal courts' differing approaches to
interpretation may similarly give different meanings to textually
indistinct provisions. Flexible construction can deviate from the
plain, textual meaning, and it is unreliable for permanence or
consistency. Wavering patterns of federal interpretation should
not control the Virginia Constitution's meaning, which is more
specific and better defines the contours of Virginians' most fun-
damental protections.22 Present federal construction differs from
the Virginia Constitution's textual meaning of inherent rights,"'
rights against self-incrimination,"' warrant requirements for sei-
zure of a person,227 and religious freedom and establishment.22 8
Present federal construction provides lesser self-incrimination,
warrant, and free exercise protections than the Virginia Constitu-
tion's plain text.229 At different times, however, federal construc-
tion has provided weaker federal protection than the present Vir-
ginia Constitution's plain text would provide. This is so for double
jeopardy,3 o antidiscrimination,2 3 1 speech and press,2 2 and arms
and militias.3 In the double jeopardy and antidiscrimination con-
texts, federal precedents that are no longer in force have greater
224. See McCullough, supra note 11, at 353.
225. See supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
226. Compare supra Part II.B.3, with United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring), and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976).
227. Compare supra Part II.B.5, with Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
228. Compare supra Part II.B.10, with Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
317 (2000) and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992), Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681
F.3d 20, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted _ U.S. _, _ S. Ct. - (May 20, 2013), and
Joyner v. Forsyth, 653 F.3d 341, 355 (4th Cir. 2011).
229. See supra Parts II.B.3, .5, .10.
230. Compare supra Part II.B.4, with United States v. Gilbert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294-
95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204) (Story, J.).
231. Compare supra Part II.B.7, with Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-67 (1948).
232. Compare supra Part II.B.8, with United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 639
(C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (Chase, J.), and Fries, 9 F. Cas. (3 Dall. 515) 826, 839-40
(C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126).
233. Compare supra Part II.B.9, with United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th
Cir. 1976) (quoting Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)), overruled
as stated in United States v. Chapman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58680 (S.D. W. Va. July 14,
2010).
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textual and historical basis than present construction. If the fed-
eral courts returned to these double jeopardy and antidiscrimina-
tion precedents, coextension would require substantial under en-
forcement of those state constitutional rights. Interpreted
according to its text and history, however, the Virginia Constitu-
tion would vindicate those rights in the absence of federal protec-
tion.
Coextensive interpretation is not justified. Virginia courts can-
not heed established rules of interpretation, according each word
significance and consistency, if they do not examine the Virginia
Constitution's actual text. Abstractly, coextension strains or nar-
rows the text with meaning it cannot support. Concretely, it
erodes substantial limitations that the Virginia Constitution im-
poses on the government. The detriment is to the constitution's
integrity and Virginians' rights-individual rights and rights of
self-government. Virginia courts should interpret these protec-
tions as they interpret other provisions in the Virginia Constitu-
tion, according to their textual meaning with assistance from his-
torical and common law background if necessary.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Interpretation has significant practical implications. Practi-
tioners and judges must navigate various state and federal rules
and doctrines when they interpret the Virginia Constitution, co-
extensively or independently. Initially, it is important to discuss
how the state and federal constitutions interact under the Su-
premacy Clause and in view of selective incorporation. Second,
this part examines how the Virginia Constitution's independent
interpretation would presently affect Virginians' claims and de-
fenses. Third, it discusses coextension's implications for the fed-
eral courts' comity toward state tribunals and jurisdiction to re-
view state decisions. Finally, it explores the normative
implications of these federal concerns, which figure into stare de-
cisis analysis.
A. Supremacy and Incorporation
State courts have "primitive" jurisdiction: their existence pre-
cedes the federal courts, and they have jurisdiction over both
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state and federal claims."3 Both state and federal substantive law
may apply, and parties will regularly litigate federal claims
alongside state claims without fearing the state claims' preemp-
tion.23 The pleadings will ultimately determine the specific legal
issues before the court,236 and state courts may entertain multiple
state and federal claims in a single case. There may be a similar
result in federal courts when state claims satisfy diversity, sup-
237plemental, or "hybrid law" federal question jurisdiction.
The Virginia Constitution applies to only the Commonwealth's
government and officers. 3 It does not and cannot reach federal
officers exercising their official, federal duties.2 39 The Federal
Constitution also targets state action, both in specific provisions24 0
and through selective incorporation. Selective incorporation has
increased the overlap of state and federal constitutional law. The
doctrine applies most 24 1 provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights
against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against states' deprivation of liberty without due process of
law.242 To the extent a state constitutional right is not preempted
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) ("I hold that the State courts will
be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal;
and I am even of opinion that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by
the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes
to which those acts may give birth."); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI; Haywood v. Drown, 556
U.S. 729, 734-35 (2009); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947); The Moses Taylor, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 421-22 (1866).
235. Nelson, supra note 20, at 231 ("[I]f state and federal law can stand together, the
Supremacy Clause does not require courts to ignore state law. Courts remain free to apply
state law except to the extent that doing so would keep them from obeying the Supremacy
Clause's direction to follow all valid rules of federal law.").
236. See BRYSON, supra note 49, § 6.02[4][a], at 6-19.
237. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367 (2006). For an extensive discussion of federal hybrid
law jurisdiction, see generally John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law
Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (2006).
238. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) ("The result is a
conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, bur-
den, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Con-
gress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we
think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has de-
clared.").
239. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1920); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276,
283 (1899); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 270 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943); Johnson, 254 U.S. at 55--56).
240. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; id. amend. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
241. JEROD H. ISRAEL, YALE KAMISAR & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
THE CONSTITUTION 28 n.13 (2012 ed., 2012); see also Manns v. Commonwealth, 213 Va.
322, 323-24, 191 S.E.2d 810, 811-12 (1972).
242. If the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause ever replaces the
Due Process Clause as incorporation's source, it would not likely affect the present discus-
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or unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution,2 43 both consti-
tutions will apply. In those cases, parties may raise claims and
defenses under both the state and federal constitutions.2 4 Each
constitution retains its own meaning, but the party's rights
against the state will be protected to their full extent. In contexts
where federal and state provisions both apply, the federal provi-
sion serves as the floor of the party's rights, and the greater pro-
tection, federal or state, will control the full extent of the party's
rights.2 45 Accordingly, when non-coextensive state and federal
constitutions address a similar protection against state action,
the non-coextensive state provision may confer rights exceeding,
but not lessening, those conferred by the Federal Constitution.246
In practice, parties' state constitutional rights become comple-
mentary. When state constitutional rights are coextensive, how-
ever, they are meaningless. They only mimic the federal protec-
tions.
B. Claims and Defenses
Coextension's abandonment most readily realizes additional
protections in the contexts of self-incrimination rights and war-
rant requirements for seizure of a person.247 The Virginia Consti-
tution protects them more robustly than the Federal Constitu-
tion, and Virginians may rely on them if the Virginia courts
interpret the Virginia Constitution independently. Free exercise
protections are also broader under the Virginia Constitution, but
federal Establishment Clause precedent will prevent those state
rights from being realized.248
Aside from implications for Virginia courts' interpretation of
Virginia statutes in accordance with the Virginia Constitution,
sion. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. _, _ & n.20, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 &
n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
243. E.g., Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632-33 (W.D. Va. 2002).
244. E.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1195-97 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying, under sep-
arate analyses, Virginia Constitution article I, section 11, article III, section 1, and article
IV, section 14 and the Federal Constitution's Seventh Amendment, Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and underlying separation of powers principles).
245. See, e.g., 1 HOWARD, supra note 23, at 203.
246. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) ("Under [Michigan v. Long], state
courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater pro-
tection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.").
247. Contra McCullough, supra note 11, at 354-57.
248. See supra footnotes 238-45 and accompanying text.
249. 4C MICHIE'S, supra note 79, § 16.
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independent interpretation has significant, present implications
for Virginians' rights before the grand jury, rights in a criminal
trial, and available state tort remedies, as well as state and local
officers' federal qualified immunity. Other Virginia constitutional
rights may similarly be enforced in excess of the Federal Consti-
tution's protections depending on trends in federal construction.
1. Independent Interpretation's Present Potential Effects
a. Self-Incrimination
Textually, the Virginia Constitution offers stronger protections
against self-incrimination. The Federal Constitution protects per-
sons "only against" self-incrimination by their own "compelled
testimonial communications."250 Although the Virginia right at-
taches only to persons in criminal proceedings, rather than cases,
it guards more broadly against means of compelled self-
incrimination. It protects against compelled self-incrimination by
giving evidence.2 5' That may include testimonial, physical, and
demonstrative evidence, and article I, section 8 retains the tradi-
tional private papers protection that the federal courts have
abandoned.252 The Fifth Amendment, selectively incorporated by
the Fourteenth Amendment, is the floor of Virginians' self-
incrimination protections against state action. Article I, section 8
may protect rights in excess.
i. Subpoenas Duces Tecum and Grand Juries
Virginia special or multi-jurisdictional grand juries may issue
subpoenas duces tecum.253 Virginia courts govern the subpoena
power's interaction with self-incrimination rights under Fifth
Amendment analysis, which no longer includes a private papers
250. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976)).
251. See supra Part II.B.3.
252. That protection was once acknowledged by the federal courts but not based pre-
cisely on the Federal Constitution's text. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-30
(1886), overruled as stated in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 526 (3d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Haimowitz, 706 F.2d 1549, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983).
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-208 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum Supp. 2012); id. § 19.2-215.5
(Repl. Vol. 2008).
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protection.2 54 Application of article I, section 8's plain text, howev-
er, would provide grand jury witnesses a right to resist producing
self-incriminating "evidence."25 5 Under this independent interpre-
tation, Virginia courts would recognize grounds for a witness to
successfully move to quash subpoenas for testimonial, physical, or
demonstrative evidence that may incriminate him.256 Rights be-
fore a special or multi-jurisdictional grand jury, however, would
not change. Virginia Code section 19.2-208 requires a special
grand jury witness be instructed that he need not testify or pro-
duce evidence "tend[ing] to incriminate him."257 If the court com-
pels him, and he validly invokes his right, the compelled testimo-
ny or evidence may not be used against him in a criminal
proceeding, unless it is a prosecution for perjury. In practice,
this Code section includes the same protection provided by article
I, section 8's textual prohibition against self-incrimination. This
statutory protection is substantively the same as the one provided
for witnesses before multi-jurisdictional grand juries.
If article I, section 8 is given its plain meaning, to the extent
that any regular grand jury compels a person's self-incrimination
by evidence, he may similarly resist that compelled self-
incrimination whether by testimony, documents, or other forms of
evidence. Relative to the Federal Constitution, proper interpreta-
tion of article I, section 8 rights against self-incrimination-as
well as statutory rights before a special or multi-jurisdictional
grand jury-are broader.260
254. See Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 20-21, 531 S.E.2d 580, 586 (2000);
see also In re Bryant, 27 Va. Cir. 414, 415-16 (1992) (City of Richmond). In re Bryant held
that the Fifth Amendment protected witnesses against producing self-incriminating doc-
uments, 27 Va. Cir. at 416 (citing Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 866-67, 127 S.E.2d
406, 417-18 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 964 (1963), but Moyer has since acknowledged
that the United States Supreme Court abandoned Boyd's Fourth and Fifth Amendment
private papers protection. 33 Va. App. at 15--16, 531 S.E.2d at 583-84.
255. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
256. See supra Part II.B.3.
257. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-208 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Sup. 2013).
258. Id.
259. Compare id., with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-215.7(B), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
260. Compare VA. CONST. art. I, section 8, and VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-208 (Repl. Vol.
2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013), and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-215.7(B), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2008), with
JOHN L. COSTELLO, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 43.5 (4th ed. 2008 & Cum.
Supp. 2012).
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ii. Exclusion
Independent interpretation would also allow a criminal de-
fendant to refuse, or move to suppress, self-incriminating evi-
dence. Article I, section 8's text itself appears to provide this out-
come, 26 1 and in a concurring opinion, a court of appeals judge
found it to be self-executing when interpreted independently. 26 2
Even if Virginia courts found that article I, section 8 was not self-
executing, according to its independent interpretation, a person
would be able to seek the exclusion of self-incriminating evidence
under Virginia Code section 19.2-60. This provision requires
seized property's return and its suppression from evidence when
the Commonwealth has obtained it by "unlawful search or sei-
zure."263 It applies to an "unlawful search or seizure,"264 but the
private papers doctrine has an acknowledged relationship with
both self-incrimination and search and seizure protections,26 5
and-in any event-Virginia courts have held that any constitu-
tional violation may justify section 19.2-60 suppression.266
iii. Virginia Torts, Immunity, and Privilege
Virginia has no cause of action against officers or agencies that
have tortiously violated her constitutionm2 6 but victims of uncon-
stitutional self-incrimination may sue the offending officer in a
common law tort action. Tort actions against the clerk, judge,
Commonwealth's Attorney, or grand jury would be unavailing be-
cause each is entitled absolute immunity for official acts. With
261. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
262. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 485, 502, 495 S.E.2d 522, 531 (1998) (Ben-
ton, J., concurring).
263. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
264. Id.
265. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 812; 19 How. St. Tri.
1029, 1038-39, 1072-73.
266. Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 942, 945, 407 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1991)
("[S]uppression is properly denied absent a showing that the evidence was seized pursuant
to a constitutional violation or pursuant to the violation of a statute which expressly pro-
vides suppression as a remedy for its breach.").
267. See DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA §
2.2(b) n.65.1 (2d ed. 2012) (citing 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 7 (4th ed. Cum. Supp. 2012);
Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Implied Cause of Action for Damages for Violations of
Provisions of State Constitutions, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619 (2000 & Supp. 2005)).
268. 2 CHARLES E. FRIEND & KENT SINcLAIR, FRIEND'S VIRGINIA PLEADING AND
PRACTICE, §§ 35.02[2][e][v], [vi], at 35-52 to 35-53 (2d ed. 2006).
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the exception of the clerk's liability for his deputies' torts, re-
spondeat superior is generally inapplicable for public officers' or
employees' torts.2 " Actions are proper, however, against officers
who improperly seize a person's personal property to compel self-
incriminating evidence against him. For example, Entick v. Car-
rington, "one of the landmarks of English liberty" in the self-
incrimination context,270 involved a trespass suit against several
of the King's messengers who improperly searched the plaintiffs
premises and took away his private papers to be used as evidence
against him.27' Lord Camden considered this search and seizure a
"means of compelling self-accusation."
The specific causes of action will vary on the facts, but trespass
to land,7 1 trespass to chattels, 274 trover and conversion,27 ' and det-
inue276 are the most appropriate in this context. 27  Different factu-
al circumstances might limit available causes of action, but plain-
tiffs must also consider the potential remedies. Trespass to land
may return nominal damages for the trespass in addition to any
actual damage to the property, consequential damages, emotional
distress, and punitive damages.7 ' A successful trespass to chat-
tels action will return damages for the personal property's "loss
and use" but not the property itself.279 Trover and conversion will
similarly return damages but not the personal property.20 Final-
269. See id., § 35.02[2][e][ix], at 35-55 & n.236 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
270. Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886), overruled on other grounds as
stated in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
271. Entrick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 807-08; 19 How. St. Tri.
1029, 1030.
272. Id. at 818; 19 How. St. Tri. at 1073 ("Lastly, it is urged as an argument of utility,
that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some
cases had been shown where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by pro-
cess. There is no process against papers in civil causes.... In the criminal law such a pro-
ceeding was never heard of.. . . But our law has provided no paper search in these cases
to help forward the convictions.... It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to ac.
cuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the
innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that
search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too the innocent would be
confounded with the guilty.").
273. See generally 2 FRIEND & SINCIAIR, supra note 268, § 27.14[1], at 27-59 to 27-63.
274. See generally id. § 27.14[2], at 27-63 to 27-64.
275. See generally id. § 27.13, at 27-51 to 27-58.
276. See generally id. § 27.12, at 27-45 to 27-51.
277. See id. § 27.14[2], at 27-63 to 27-64.
278. See id. § 27.14[1][e], at 27-60 to 27-61.
279. Id. § 27.14[2], at 27-64 (citing Vines v. Branch, 244 Va. 185, 418 S.E.2d 890
(1992)).
280. Id. § 27.13[4], at 27-56.
2013] 461
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ly, detinue may return the personal property, if it is available, or
else return "its value at the time of the verdict."2 '81
Defendant officers may rely on whatever immunity their agen-
cy is entitled.282 The protection is available for their discretionary
acts but not ministerial acts.2 8 If the officer is acting in his discre-
tion, however, he is not "immunized from suit," but the standard
for liability becomes gross negligence instead of simple negli-
gence.284 It does not shield officers from liability for intentional
torts.2 " Defending against intentional tort actions, officers will
more frequently rely on a privilege defense.
The plaintiff must show each element of the tort has been sat-
isfied, and one of the most important elements in any intentional
tort is that the act was "unprivileged."' Although other privileg-
es may be available depending on the underlying facts, the de-
fendant officer will most likely defend himself with the privilege
of legal authority."' Acts taken under legal authority are privi-
leged."' But for the legal authority privilege, most law enforce-
ment conduct would be actionable.' Law enforcement officials
regularly detain or apprehend persons or enter upon persons'
land, but they are protected because they act within their legal
authority-usually under a valid warrant or other circumstances
justifying the conduct.2 "' When they do so, tort actions against
them will fail."' Official actions lacking valid legal authority,
however, are not privileged, and state or local officers' federal or
state constitutional violations will remove the privilege.2
281. Id. § 27.12[2], at 27-46 (citing MARTIN P. BURKS & T. MUNFORD BOYD, COMMON
LAW AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 154 (4th ed. 1952)). The property may be
recovered before trial. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-114 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp.
Codification 2013).
282. CHARLES E. FRIEND, PERSONAL INJURY LAW IN VIRGINIA, § 11.3, at 264 (3d ed.
2003 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
283. Id. § 11.3, at 265.
284. Id. § 11.3, at 55, 57 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
285. See 2 FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 268, § 35.02[2][e] [ii], [iii], [iv], at 35-51 to 35-
52.
286. Id. § 25.03[8], at 25-59.
287. E.g., FRIEND, supra note 282, § 7.3, at 190-91.
288. 1 FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 268, § 25.03[8][c], at 25-61.
289. Cf. id. § 25.03[8][c], at 25-61 to 25-62 (explaining how legal authority keeps a po-
lice officer's actions from being tortious).
290. E.g., FRIEND, supra note 282, § 7.3, at 191.
291. E.g., id. § 7.3, at 191 (citing Parker v. McCoy, 212 Va. 808, 188 S.E.2d 222 (1972)).
292. E.g., id. § 7.3, at 191 (citing Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., 211 Va. 645, 179
S.E.2d 497 (1971); Banks v. Bradley, 192 Va. 598, 66 S.E.2d 526 (1951)).
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Officers' article I, section 8 self-incrimination violations, as in-
dependently interpreted, allow the intentional tort action to pro-
ceed for compelled self-incrimination by testimonial, physical, or
demonstrative evidence. Compelled self-incrimination by physical
or demonstrative evidence would be privileged under the Fifth
Amendment or a coextensive article I, section 8, both of which on-
ly protect a person's testimonial evidence from compelled self-
incrimination.2 93 Interpreting article I, section 8 independently
and according to its plain, textual meaning, however, plaintiffs
have viable intentional tort actions when officers compel their
self-incrimination by any form of evidence.
iv. Federal Qualified Immunity
A state or local officer's article I, section 8 violation may have
42 U.S.C. section 1983 consequences. Section 1983 does not target
their state law violations," but the Fourth Circuit has held that
acts clearly beyond an officer's scope of authority, as informed by
state law, will not permit the officer to raise a federal qualified
immunity defense. 29 5 The court applies this test as a precondition
to the two-part qualified immunity analysis.2 96 The precondition is
a minority rule among the federal circuits. Only the Fourth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits adhere to it.297
293. Compare supra Part II.B.3, and 1 FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 268, §
25.03[8][c], at 25-61 to 25-62.
294. Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749, 757 (W.D. Va. 1986), affd, 823 F.2d 546
(4th Cir. 1987); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12
(1984); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 6, 9-11 (1980).
295. Better Gov't Bureau v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582, 593-94 (4th Cir.
1997), rhsg en banc denied 119 F.3d 1129, cert. denied 522 U.S. 1047 (1998).
296. Id.; see also In re Allen, 119 F.3d at 1133. For a recent reiteration of the two-part
qualified immunity test, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Har-
low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.").
297. Compare In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 593-94, Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th
Cir. 1988), and Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987), with Eddy v. V.I.
Water & Power Auth., 256 F.3d 204, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2001), and Varrone v. Bilotti, 123
F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1997), and Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir.
1994), and Goyco de Maldonado v. Rivera, 849 F.2d 683, 687-88 (1st Cir. 1988), and
Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 559-60 (5th Cir. 1986), and Coleman v. Frantz,
754 F.2d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 1985), abrogated in part on other grounds by Benson v. All-
phin, 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1986), and T.S. v. Gabbard, No. 10-217-KSF, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82548, at 5-16 (E.D. Ky. June 14, 2012). The minority rule seems at odds with the
United States Supreme Court's precedent, Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 (1994) (ci-
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If a state or local officer violated the plaintiffs federal constitu-
tional or statutory rights, accruing the plaintiffs Section 1983
cause of action, and the defendant officer acted clearly beyond his
scope of authority under the Virginia Constitution, a court in the
Fourth, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits will find that the defendant
may not even raise the qualified immunity defense. The court will
not conduct the two-part qualified immunity analysis. Without
the qualified immunity shield, the litigation will proceed to trial
to determine whether the defendant officer violated the plaintiffs
federal statutory or constitutional rights and what damages the
plaintiff may be entitled.
In this context, if an officer violates a person's federal rights
while clearly violating article I, section 11's prohibition against
compelling a person's self-incrimination by evidence, then he for-
feits his qualified immunity defense in any resulting section 1983
action. Article I, section 11's independent interpretation would
bar the officer's qualified immunity defense beyond the Fifth
Amendment ground of compelled self-incrimination by testimoni-
al evidence; compelled self-incrimination by physical and demon-
strative evidence would also prevent the officer from raising the
defense.
b. Warrant Requirements for Seizure of a Person
Virginia imposes a more onerous standard for valid warrants to
seize a person. It requires the offense's particular-"[s]ingle, indi-
vidual, relating to distinct persons or things" and "attentive to
minute circumstances""'-description and evidentiary support for
a warrant to seize a person.2 99 For a valid warrant to either search
or seize, the Federal Constitution requires probable cause, based
on a "totality of circumstances," supported by an oath or affirma-
tion."oo The article I, section 10 requirement exceeds the floor set
by the Fourth Amendment, as selectively incorporated by the
tation omitted) ("Davis, in short, concerned not the authorities a court may consider in de-
termining qualified immunity, but this entirely discrete question: Is qualified immunity
defeated where a defendant violates any clearly established duty, including one under
state law, or must the clearly established right be the federal right on which the claim for
relief is based? The Court held the latter.") Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 & n.12
(1984), but an evenly divided Fourth Circuit denied In re Allen's rehearing en banc. 119
F.3d 1129, 1129 (4th Cir. 1997).
298. 2 ASH, supra note 161.
299. See supra Part II.B.5.
300. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
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Fourteenth Amendment. Article I, section 10's independent inter-
pretation, according to its plain, textual meaning, will allow per-
sons to rely on this greater right.
i. Exclusion
A warrant for a person's seizure will produce the person, and it
may also produce evidence that the police seize from the person
incident to his seizure or arrest. Virginia Code section 19.2-60 al-
lows an aggrieved person to move a Virginia trial court to sup-
press and return property obtained by an "unlawful search or sei-
zure.""o' Interpreting article I, section 10's requirements to seize a
person independently, and beyond the Fourth Amendment re-
quirement,3 0 2 section 19.2-60 may suppress evidence seized pur-
suant to warrants to seize a person that fail to particularly de-
scribe the person's offense. Article I, section 10's independent
interpretation would allow for more instances of suppression than
its coextensive interpretation.
ii. Virginia Torts, Immunity, and Privilege
Traditionally, persons remedied officers' unconstitutional
searches and seizures in common law tort actions."os Depending
on the specific facts, a state or local officer's violation of article I,
section 10's requirement for seizure warrants may be liable for
personal injury.o' Unlawful searches and seizures are not proper-
ty injuries,o' but they may attend the unlawful search or seizure,
and the plaintiff may, then, have additional, independent causes
of action for those property torts.306
Available personal injury torts may include battery, 3 as-
sault,o' false imprisonment," and malicious prosecution."0 A
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
302. See supra Part II.B.5.
303. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
774, 777, 786 (1994); see also McCullough, supra note 11, at 354 n.30 (citing Jordan v.
Shands, 255 Va. 492, 497, 500 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1998)); e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 19 How. St. Tri. 1029; Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(K.B.); 19 How. St. Tri. 10.
304. See FRIEND, supra note 282, § 6.4.C, at 186.
305. See id.
306. See supra notes 273-81 and accompanying text.
307. See generally FRIEND, supra note 282, § 6.2, at 173-80.
308. See generally id. § 6.3, at 180-85 (3d ed. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
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successful battery action may yield damages for the injury itself,
pain, related expenses, lost income, shame, and punitive damag-
es."' The same damages are available for a successful assault ac-
tion.32 For false imprisonment torts, successful plaintiffs may re-
ceive compensatory damages for "mental pain and suffering,
indignity, and humiliation" as well as possible punitive damag-
es.' Finally, a plaintiff may be awarded damages for reputation-
al harm, disgrace, or distress and possible punitive damages for a
successful malicious prosecution action. 14
If the officer's employer agency is entitled immunity, he may
rely on that immunity if his actions were discretionary and not
ministerial." Whether the seizures constitute discretionary or
ministerial acts, the officer's immunity only raises the standard
for liability from simple to gross negligence.3 16 The officer is not
immunized from suit, and actions for intentional tort may pro-
ceed.' The lawful authority privilege will likely come into issue.
If Virginia courts independently interpret the warrant require-
ments for seizure of a person, the lawful authority privilege will
not defeat the plaintiffs tort action when the officer has seized
the person under authority of a warrant failing the article I, sec-
tion 10 requirements that the offense be particularly described
and supported by evidence. Officers must then rely on some other
defense or else the plaintiff will prevail.
iii. Federal Qualified Immunity
Article I, section 10's independent interpretation has similar
implications for federal Section 1983 qualified immunity in the
Fourth, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits. If a state or local officer vio-
lates a person's federal statutory or constitutional rights while
clearly violating article I, section 10's warrant requirement for
309. See generally 1 FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 268, § 25.03[4], at 25-42 to 25-48.
310. See generally id. § 25.03[5], at 25-48 to 25-55.
311. FRIEND, supra note 282, § 6.2.8, at 180.
312. See id. § 6.3.1(5) at 184 ("There is virtually no case law in Virginia distinguishing
between the tort of assault and the tort of battery.').
313. 1 FRIEND & SINCLAIR, supra note 268, § 25.03[41[d], at 25-45.
314. Id. § 25.03[5][g], at 25-54 to 25-55.
315. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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seizure of a person, he forfeits his qualified immunity defense in a
section 1983 action.
2. Independent Interpretation's Prospective Effects
Independent interpretation's effect on litigants' rights under
the Virginia Constitution will depend largely on trends in federal
construction. The federal courts' narrowing of federal constitu-
tional rights would allow the state constitutions greater force, but
the federal courts' expansion of federal constitutional rights
would renew the former trend of targeting and directing a greater
scope of state action.31 ' The constitutions' interaction will depend
largely on the respective courts' interpretation, but some possible
outcomes are apparent. Several special concerns warrant addi-
tional discussion.
Whenever Virginia constitutional rights impose greater protec-
tions than similar federal constitutional rights, independent in-
terpretation's effects will be similar to those for self-incrimination
and warrants for seizure of a person. Persons whose Virginia con-
stitutional rights have been infringed may have available causes
of action in tort for damages against state or local officers.32 0 in
Section 1983 litigation in the Fourth, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits,
clear state constitution violations may defeat state or local offic-
ers' ability to even raise a qualified immunity defense. 321 Finally,
if a criminal charge or conviction is invalid under the Virginia
Constitution, the defendant or prisoner is entitled acquittal or re-
lease, and his conviction will not be valid. If Virginia courts give
independent force to the Virginia Constitution when its protec-
tions are stronger than the federal courts' construction of similar
federal provisions, Virginia litigants may realize substantive ef-
fects.
Special concerns may arise where the Federal Constitution pro-
tects competing rights. Interacting with the incorporated federal
provisions, Virginia constitutional rights may be enforced more
vigilantly than federal constitutional rights as long as they do not
undermine federal rights.322 It will be rarer that the Federal Con-
318. See supra Part III.B.1.a.iii.
319. Cf. supra note 25-26 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Parts III.B.1.a.ii, b.i.
321. See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part III.A.
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stitution prevents broader Virginia rights' enforcement, but those
difficulties may arise when constitutional provisions protect com-
peting interests. Those may include religious freedom and estab-
lishment... and antidiscrimination.3 24 If Virginia courts find article
I, section 16 protects private persons' prayers or invocations in
public forums such as legislative proceedings and public schools'
athletic events and graduation ceremonies, they may not enforce
those broader state free exercise rights because the incorporated
Establishment Clause protections do not allow it.325 Antidiscrimi-
nation may raise similar issues in the affirmative action context.
Affirmative action's interaction with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause remains to be clarified,2  but it
may be significant for state protections' independent interpreta-
tion. The United States Supreme Court has limited permissible
affirmative action," but the Sixth Circuit recently held that
states may not use constitutional referenda to bar universities
from considering race in admissions decisions.3 " Depending on
coming federal decisions, competing constitutional interests of
limiting affirmative action and preserving it could weaken inde-
pendent interpretation's potential effects in this context. Virginia
litigators and courts must remain aware of competing constitu-
tional interests that may preempt broader state protections.
323. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, § 12.1, at 1183 & n.9 ("[T]here is also often a tension
between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Government actions to facilitate free
exercise might be challenged as impermissible establishments, and government efforts to
refrain from establishing religion might be objected to as denying the free exercise of reli-
gion.").
324. See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law):
Affirmative Action in Texas and Michigan, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 1, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-affirm
ative-action-in-texas-and-michigan/.
325. Compare supra Part II.B.10, with Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
301, 307-13 (2000), and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589, 591-94, 599 (1992), Galloway
v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted - U.S. _, S. Ct.
_ (May 20, 2013), and Joyner v. Forsyth, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011).
326. See Wermiel, supra note 324.
327. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466,
471 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003))
("[U]niversities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups" or treat their
applications uniquely. But the Court allowed universities to continue "consider[ing] race
or ethnicity more flexibly as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration
.... along with other relevant factors." (second alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)), cert. granted, sub nom. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Af-
firmative Action, U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013).
328. Id. at 485.
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Realization of these prospective effects depends greatly on the
cases appearing before state and federal courts as well as future
trends in state and federal courts' constitutional interpretation.
These issues may be important if federal precedent requires dif-
ferent outcomes from the Virginia Constitution's text, especially if
federal protections are weaker than those provided in the Virgin-
ia Constitution.
C. Federal Comity and Jurisdiction
In cases involving the Virginia Constitution, practitioners and
courts must consider the federal courts' hesitancy to interpret
state law and their limited jurisdiction to review state decisions.
The Virginia Constitution's independent or coextensive interpre-
tation implicates these doctrines.
1. Interpretation of State Laws
Out of respect for state tribunals3 29 and their expertise in state
law,3 o federal courts generally avoid interpreting state laws. This
concern manifests itself in certified questions,"' United States
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction,332 habeas jurisdiction,"'
329. See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAUREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAS, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS 252 (2d ed.
2009).
330. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2003).
331. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (footnote omitted) ("It does,
of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative
judicial federalism." (emphasis added)); e.g., Travco Ins. Co. v. Ward, 468 F. App'x 195,
201 (4th Cir. 2012) ("[B]ecause no controlling Virginia appellate decision, constitutional
provision, or statute appears to address the precise question presented in this case, and
the answer to the certified question is potentially determinative of this appeal, the ques-
tion is properly subject to review by the Supreme Court of Virginia on certification."); Boyd
v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1199 (4th Cir. 1989) (relying on the Supreme Court of Virginia's
answer to a certified question to resolve application of the Virginia Constitution). Federal
courts of appeals are within their discretion to certify questions of state law to a state su-
preme court when the state permits jurisdiction to answer. Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at
389-91; e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:40 (Repl. Vol. 2013).
332. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). For further discussion,
see infra Part III.C.2.
333. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991)). Congress has also acted to protect the finality of state court habeas deci-
sions. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec.
104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)); see also id.
sec. 101, 106, at 1217, 1220-21 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006)).
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well-pleaded complaints, preemption," qualified immunity,33
res judicata,"" and abstention of federal jurisdiction.'
Two practical considerations further inform this concern.'
First, the federal courts concede that state judges are "often far
more expert . .. at understanding the implications of each deci-
sion in [their] practiced field."'o State judges are generally more
familiar with the state's constitution and laws. For example, a re-
cent Fourth Circuit opinion misconstrued a Virginia statute's en-
actment date when the court failed to observe Virginia's constitu-
tional procedures for legislative enactment.34 ' Apprehension over
similar results may justify certified questions or abstention of ju-
334. See generally City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997); Mer-
rell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
335. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); City of Falls Church v. Fairfax Cnty. Water Auth., 272 F. App'x 252,
256-57 (4th Cir. 2008).
336. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
337. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). See
generally Effect of State Law on Federal Res Judicata Rules, 18B FED. PRAC. & PROC. §
4472 (Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller eds., 2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012).
338. E.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996); Colo. River Water
Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 593-95 (1968) (per curiam);
Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943); R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500-01 (1941) ("Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a fed-
eral chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies, whether the pol-
icy relates to the enforcement of the criminal law, or the administration of a specialized
scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, or the final authority of a state
court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state.") (internal citations omitted);
Front Royal & Warren Cnty. Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 945 F.2d 760, 764-
65 (4th Cir. 1991) (abstaining jurisdiction because the case centered on Virginia's annexa-
tion courts and because plaintiffs had available Virginia constitutional and statutory rem-
edies); AFA Distributing Co. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210, 1214 (4th Cir. 1973)
("Peripheral and episodic federal court interpretations of state statutory schemes of con-
trol are not desirable and could be harmful."). Comity concerns have similarly compelled
Congress to limit federal jurisdiction. E.g., Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968 (cod-
ified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006)); Tax Injunction Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 932 (1948) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)); Johnson Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 932 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (2006)); Anti-Injunction Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 932 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1341, 2283 (2006)); see also Norris-Laguardia Act, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2006)).
339. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2003).
340. Id.; see also Davis, 468 U.S. at 195 (fretting that under appellee's argument "quali-
fied immunity then might depend upon the meaning or purpose of a state administrative
regulation, questions that federal judges often may be unable to resolve on summary
judgment").
341. Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19 n.5, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, No. 11-420 (Sept. 30, 2011) (citing VA. CONST. art. V, § 6(b)(iii)), with Virginia ex
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2011).
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risdiction.3 42 The federal courts are more comfortable applying
state law when the state supreme court has provided precedent to
guide their analysis,3 43 but they are still wary. They exhibit the
strong "caution appropriate to a federal court called upon to in-
terpret a state constitution."3 " Second, judicial selection suggests
compelling sovereign interests. The president nominates poten-
tial federal Justices and judges, and the Senate may confirm
them."' Bar admission and state residency are not constitutional-
ly required. Federal judges' principle charge is to interpret and
apply the Constitution and laws of the United States in cases and
controversies before them.3 46 In contrast, a state's judges are of
the state's particular choosing and specialty. In Virginia, the
General Assembly selects the Commonwealth's justices and judg-
es by majority vote.347 They must be Virginia residents, and they
must have been admitted to the Virginia bar at least five years
before their appointment.348 They take an oath to support the
Constitution and laws of the United States in addition to the Vir-
ginia Constitution.34 9 Federal judges have no charge or oath to
uphold the Virginia Constitution; they serve a different sovereign.
Those most familiar with state practice-state judges, who have
been members of the state bar and have been chosen by the sov-
ereign state they serve-are better entrusted to interpret their
state laws and constitution.
Coextension tends to lessen the federal courts' comity concerns,
and it may lessen their occasion to certify questions to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia or cautiously heed Virginia precedents.
Discussing an answer to a certified question, the Fourth Circuit
observed that the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of
the Virginia Constitution was "absolutely binding.""' For similar
342. Compare Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974), with R.R. Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
343. E.g., Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 521-25 (4th Cir. 1986).
344. Id. at 524.
345. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
346. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
347. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; BRYSON, supra note 49, § 2.01, at 2-2 to 2-3. During recess,
the governor may fill a vacancy by appointing a justice "to serve until thirty days after the
commencement of the next session of the General Assembly." VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
348. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. The same holds true for "all judges of other courts of rec-
ord" in Virginia. Id.
349. Id. (requiring Virginia's constitutional officers take an oath to support the federal
and Virginia constitutions); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI (binding state judges to uphold the
Constitution and laws of the United States).
350. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1989).
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reasons, the Fourth Circuit has observed that federal courts must
exercise particular "caution" when interpreting a state's constitu-
tion.' But the federal courts will equally respect Virginia courts'
interpretation of the Virginia Constitution as coextensive; they
will interpret it according to federal precedent.' In the latter
case, although they interpret the Virginia Constitution in fact,
they apply the Federal Constitution. Federal precedents control
its meaning and undermine the federal courts' comity concerns
that may otherwise justify cautious adherence to Virginia prece-
dent when interpreting the Virginia Constitution or certifying a
question to the Supreme Court of Virginia when there is no con-
trolling precedent.
2. Federal Review of State Decisions
The United States Supreme Court may review state courts' de-
cisions only when they involve federal law.' State sovereignty
compels this narrowed appellate jurisdiction.' Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
state cases when the state court's judgment does not rest on ade-
quate and independent state grounds.' This rule similarly ap-
plies for federal district courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction over
state prisoners' claims,56 although the justification is slightly dif-
ferent."
351. Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 524 (4th Cir. 1986).
352. E.g., Glassman v. Arlington Cnty., 628 F.3d 140, 149-50 (4th Cir. 2010).
353. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
354. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) ("Any interference with
either, except as [constitutionally] permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State,
and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.") (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
considered the principle-"in a different but closely related context"-vital to the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine, suggesting "complementary" rationales for Arti-
cle III jurisdiction and our federalism. HELLMAN, ROBEL & R. STRAS, supra note 329, at
252 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
355. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991)); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
356. Lee, 534 U.S. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729); e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1243-44 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
357. Concerns of comity and federalism inform the adequate and independent state
grounds analysis, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730-31, but jurisdiction is predi-
cated on determining "whether the petitioner 'is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States,"' id. at 730 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988)), and
the petitioner must exhaust avenues of state review. Id. at 731.
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State grounds are adequate when they serve as the decision's
"fair or substantial basis."' They are inadequate when state law
does not dispose of the entire case.' State grounds are independ-
ent when the decision clearly rests on state law.360 Relevant to
this discussion, state grounds are not independent when they
"depend[] upon the state court's view of the reach of the [Federal
Constitution].""' The United States Supreme Court instructed in
Michigan v. Long,
When ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on
federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not
clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reason-
able explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so. If a state
court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by
a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases
are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not them-
selves compel the result that the court has reached. . . . If the state
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds,
362
we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that state courts
are the appropriate interpreters of state constitutions: "It is fun-
damental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in in-
terpreting their state constitutions.""' Nonetheless, the Court
must review state courts when their decisions implicate the Fed-
eral Constitution's meaning and precedent.36 4 A state court may
358. Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540-41
(1930) ("[Ihf there is no evasion of the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal ground of
decision has fair support, this Court will not inquire whether the rule applied by the state
court is right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what should be deemed the better
rule, for that of the state court.") (internal citations omitted).
359. E.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98-99, 109 (1938) (finding
the state statutory grounds inadequate to dispose of the case, given the remaining federal
issue whether the state statute's repeal was valid under the Federal Constitution's Con-
tracts Clause).
360. See Wise v. Williams, 982 F.2d 142, 144 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Coleman, 501
U.S. at 740).
361. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)
362. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
363. Minnesota v. Nat'1 Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940), quoted in Bush v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
364. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1995) ("[W]e [have] recognized that our au-
thority as final arbiter of the United States Constitution could be eroded by a lack of clari-
ty in state-court decisions."); see also Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 524 (4th Cir. 1986).
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readily avoid this outcome by following Michigan v. Long's in-
structions.
Federal review of state decisions implicates coextension. A
state decision grounded on a coextensive provision in a state con-
stitution-however adequate it may be-is not independent, and
the United States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction or a dis-
trict court's habeas jurisdiction may attach.365 Conversely, a state
decision clearly grounded on the state constitution alone is inde-
pendent, and the state supreme court retains the final authority
to interpret and apply the state constitution.36 6
The best way to avert federal review of state constitutional de-
cisions is for Virginia courts to ground their analysis inde-
pendently-on the Virginia Constitution's text and historical and
common law background. Many cases may involve distinct issues
of federal and Virginia law, and the issues involving the Virginia
Constitution may not be adequate to avert federal review. In
those cases, the federal courts may review the federal law issues,
but the state law issues go no further. They are preserved accord-
ing to the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation.
D. Federalism Implications
The Federal Constitution enshrines our federalism, and it is
one of the constitutional convention's most important and lasting
judgments. Federal doctrines-including selective incorporation,
comity, and jurisdiction over state decisions-are significant for
both state and federal practice, and coextension's interaction with
them demonstrates the extent of its faults.
First, coextension-alongside selective incorporation-limits
state constitutional provisions to mere redundancies. The result
is the state provisions' essential repeal. However, independently,
those state protections might vindicate or defend individual
rights. As much as it sought to increase federal power, the Recon-
365. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1983) (finding jurisdiction satisfied in a
state supreme court decision invoking both the federal and state constitutions because
"[t]he references to the State Constitution in no way indicate[d] that the decision below
rested on grounds in any way independent from the state court's interpretation of federal
law.").
366. See Evans, 514 U.S. at 8; Frederic S. Le Clercq, The Process of Selecting Constitu-
tional Standards: Some Incongruities of Tennessee Practice, 61 TENN. L. REV. 573, 578
(1994).
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struction Congress intended incorporation to supplement-not
limit-rights against state action."' Further, it is difficult to im-
agine the same Virginians who feared the prospect of "uniform
national standard[s] ... imposed on the states"' convening in
1776 to establish courts that would redundantly impose then-
unforeseen federal standards under the name, but to the exclu-
sion, of their Declaration of Rights.
Second, the federal courts show state courts great comity. State
courts should be grateful for the gesture, but they undermine it
when they declare their state constitutions coextensive with the
Federal Constitution. Federal judges are experts in the Federal
Constitution and laws, but their general uneasiness interpreting
state law dissuades their binding interpretation of the Virginia
Constitution.' Even though they apply federal precedent, they
interpret coextensive state constitutions as state constitutions in
fact, and the federal courts are in an uncomfortable position as
the final interpreters of a sovereign state's fundamental law."7 '
Coextensive interpretation upsets the federal courts' comity to-
ward state tribunals and confuses the proper spheres of sover-
eignty.
Finally, interpreting a state constitution coextensively, the
state supreme court allows some of its authority to fall to the
United States Supreme Court. This is more than outsourcing the
state constitution's interpretation and meaning."' It is also the
state supreme court's effective resignation of its own final author-
ity to interpret its state constitution, allowing that duty to fall to
a different sovereign's supreme court. In this regard, it effectively
becomes a court of intermediary authority. This is a peculiar out-
come for a federal system. The federal judiciary should have no
interest in how state courts interpret their states' constitutions,
and it generally does not.372 The United States Supreme Court be-
comes the final interpreter of state constitutional provisions when
they are deemed coextensive. It is a position appropriate for the
367. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. _, -, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060-61
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
368. Hylton, supra note 2, at 465-66.
369. See supra Part III.C.1.
370. E.g., Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940), quoted in Bush v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
371. Cf. McCullough, supra note 11, at 350.
372. Compare Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. at 557, with Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516, 524
(4th Cir. 1986).
2013]1 475
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court of Virginia and one the United States Supreme
Court does not desire. It befits a sovereign Commonwealth to
have her own judiciary, selected from her own citizenry and bar,
bear that duty.
E. Stare Decisis
Virginia courts have recognized ten constitutional protections
to be coextensive with the Federal Constitution. Those cases
stand as precedent. When appropriate cases appear before the
Supreme Court of Virginia, however, stare decisis principles will
warrant coextension's abandonment.
Virginia courts honor precedent under stare decisis, but they
will discontinue it when they discover that it is based on "flagrant
error or mistake."' The Supreme Court of Virginia does not
blindly repeat past errors, but it acknowledges that critical reex-
amination of its precedent "will enhance confidence in the judici-
ary and strengthen the importance of stare decisis in [its] juris-
prudence."' Stare decisis will not save precedent that is
foundationally mistaken, underappreciates the legislative power,
and produces confusion."' Constitutional provisions' coextensive
interpretation suffers from all three defects.
First, coextensive interpretation's original invocation miscon-
strued Professor Howard's observations and conferred Fourth
Amendment meaning on article I, section 10 when its text plainly
did not apply. Its extension to other constitutional provisions has
similarly ignored substantive textual differences between the fed-
eral and Virginia constitutions as well as Virginia's well-
established rules of constitutional interpretation. Second, the ap-
proach weakens Virginians' power to design their constitution by
convention or amendment. Only the Virginia people may alter the
Virginia Constitution,7 ' and coextensive interpretation imports
text and meaning chosen by different conventions of different
peoples. Third, coextension's practical implications upset the fed-
373. Nelson v. Warden of the Keen Mt. Corr. Ctr., 262 Va. 276, 280, 552 S.E.2d 73, 75
(2001) (quoting Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
374. Nunnally v. Artis, 254 Va. 247, 253, 492 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1997).
375. Nelson, 262 Va. at 284, 522 S.E.2d at 77.
376. Compare VA. CONST. art. I, § 3, and id., art. XII, §§ 1-2, with Town of Galax v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 177 Va. 29, 32, 12 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1941).
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eral judiciary's efforts to respect state sovereignty; these implica-
tions question the Virginia Constitution's force and allow the
United States Supreme Court to serve the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's proper role as the final judicial authority on the Virginia
Constitution's interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Virginia judges are experts in the Commonwealth's constitu-
tion and laws, and they may readily interpret them according to
their text and history. When parties raise claims or defenses un-
der the Virginia and federal constitutions or under only the Vir-
ginia Constitution, Virginia courts should apply the Virginia
Constitution independently. They should rely on Michigan v.
Long's specific prescriptions to ensure that Virginia law decisions
are independently grounded. Interpreting the Virginia Constitu-
tion, they should accord each provision its plain, textual meaning,
and they may rely on historical and common law background
when additional guidance is necessary. When similar state and
federal claims and defenses are litigated alongside each other,
state rights may vindicate or defend litigants beyond the federal
standard. Although Virginia law issues will not always be ade-
quate to avert federal review, their meaning remains significant
for Virginia precedent and should be grounded independently.
Preserving the Virginia Constitution's independent meaning en-
sures constancy, and may vindicate Virginia rights when federal
rights are not as robust, whether those federal rights are plainly
narrower or constructed to be so.
Robert S. Claiborne, Jr. *
* I am greatly indebted to the Hon. Stephen R. McCullough of the Court of Appeals of
Virginia, whose piece, A Vanishing Virginia Constitution?, inspired my interest in this top-
ic. I owe additional thanks to the Annual Survey Editor, Chris Bascom, as well as Profes-
sors W. Hamilton Bryson, John F. Preis, John Paul Jones, and John G. Douglass for their
critical review and advice, which greatly improved this piece from its earlier drafts. Final-
ly, I owe special thanks to Glenice Coombs, the editors, and the staff of the University of
Richmond Law Review; this piece would not be possible without their hard work and dedi-
cation.
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